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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ARIS VISION INSTITUTE, INC., a 
California corporation, dba ARIS 
VISION, INC., 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V. 
WASATCH PROPERTY 
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah 
corporation, JDJ PROPERTIES, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
CaseNo.20040304-CA 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann., 
§78-2-2(3)0) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit error in ruling that Appellee Aris Vision Institute, 
Inc. ("Aris") did not abandon the premises and breach its Lease Agreement (the "Lease") 
with Appellant JDJ Properties, Inc. ("JDJ"), and that JDJ was therefore not entitled to 
recover damages on its Counterclaim? This issue presents questions of law with respect 
to the legal standard of abandonment, whether a leasehold still existed after Aris vacated 
the premises and the interpretation of the Lease. The trial court's decision is reviewed for 
correctness. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 
(Utah 1998); State of Utah v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966, 970 (Utah App. 1998). 
This issue was preserved below. [See, e.g., R. 103-112; 169-174; 219; 235; 347-
349] 
2. Did the trial court commit error in ruling that Aris was entitled to recover treble 
damages for forcible detainer and to recover damages for wrongful eviction when Aris 
was not in possession of the premises at the time of the alleged forcible detainer and 
wrongful eviction or within five days of the alleged forcible detainer; Aris had vacated 
the premises without paying rent and had turned over possession of the premises to third 
parties more than two weeks prior to the alleged forcible detainer and wrongful eviction; 
Aris never thereafter desired or attempted to occupy the premises; and JDJ had a 
contractual right in, and statutory lien on, the equipment? This issue presents questions of 
law. The trial court's decision is reviewed for correctness. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. 
Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 1998). 
This issue was preserved below. [See, e.g., R. 103-112; 169-176; 217-226; 230-
231; 346-356; 529 at 558-579; 304-307]. 
3. Did the trial court error in determining that Wasatch and JDJ had converted 
Aris's equipment where Aris abandoned the premises without removing the equipment, 
the doctors to whom Aris had given possession of the equipment and premises weeks 
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before were in possession of the equipment on January 22 when Aris attempted to take 
possession, JDJ had a lessor's lien on the equipment when Aris attempted to take 
possession of the equipment on January 22 and Aris did not demand possession of the 
equipment after the doctors vacated the premises? This issue presents questions of law. 
The trial court's decision is reviewed for correctness. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. 
Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 1998). 
This issue was preserved below. [See, e.g., R. 526 at 41-45 & 161; R. 413, Finding 
No. 29; R. 307-308; 231-232] Although Wasatch and JDJ did not expressly raise the 
statutory lessor's lien below, the evidence was that JDJ claimed the equipment as security 
for the rent and the existence of a lessor's lien is purely a question of law which can be 
raised for the first time on appeal. State of Utah v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 
1994). 
4. Did the trial court commit error in ruling that Aris was entitled to recover 
damages to its equipment of $187,687.60 when: (a) There was no evidence that Aris was 
unable to sell the equipment from the premises or that the fact the equipment remained on 
the premises interfered with the efforts to sell; (b) The evidence was insufficient to 
support damages based upon depreciation; (c) The methodology of Aris's damage expert 
was fatally defective; (d) Aris failed to prove that Wasatch or JDJ was responsible for the 
missing or damaged equipment; and (e) Aris was not entitled to recover for lost 
opportunity damages. 
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The trial court's decision is reviewed on a clearly erroneous standard. Estate of 
Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 977 (Utah 1996). Aris's entitlement to lost opportunity 
damages also presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Aurora Credit 
Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Utah 1998). 
This issue was preserved below [See, e.g., R. 232-233; 308-310; R. 529 at 573-574 
& 576]. 
III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
Aris leased premises from JDJ for the operation of a laser eye surgery clinic. 
Defendant and Appellant Wasatch Property Management, Inc. ("Wasatch") managed the 
premises for JDJ. Aris ceased all business operations and vacated the premises on 
January 4, 2002 without paying rent. Without JDJ's knowledge or consent, Aris turned 
over possession of the premises to the independent contractor doctors who performed 
surgeries at the premises to conduct their own business on the premises while Aris and 
the doctors attempted to negotiate an agreement for the doctors to purchase Aris's 
equipment on the premises and assume Aris's Lease with JDJ. 
When Aris and the doctors had been unable to come to an agreement, Aris sent a 
representative to the premises on January 22, 2002 to remove the equipment that the 
doctors were then utilizing in their business. When Aris was not permitted to remove the 
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equipment, Aris filed (but did not serve) a Complaint in this action alleging forcible 
detainer, wrongful eviction and conversion of its equipment, as well as a claim for 
declaratory relief. Aris sought damages for not being permitted to remove its equipment. 
Aris also sought replevin of its equipment. [R. 1-26] 
On or about February 15, 2002, Aris filed and served an Amended Complaint [R. 
27-48] and a motion for a writ of replevin and supporting memorandum and affidavits. 
[R. 49-86] The hearing on the replevin motion was later postponed and then cancelled 
and the parties worked together for several months to attempt to re-let the premises and 
sell the equipment. When these efforts were unsuccessful, Wasatch and JDJ permitted 
Aris to remove the equipment from the premises on July 2, 2002. On October 28, 2002, 
JDJ filed a Counterclaim seeking lost rental damages for Aris's breach of the Lease. [R. 
103-112] 
A bench trial was held before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on October 14 
through 16, 2003. [R. 526-528] Thereafter, closing arguments were heard by the court on 
November 14, 2003. [R. 529] 
On January 27, 2004, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision finding in 
favor of Aris on the Complaint and dismissing JDJ's Counterclaim. The trial court 
allowed Aris recovery on its forcible detainer, wrongful eviction and conversion claims in 
the amount of $187,687.60 for depreciation and damage to the equipment, and for the 
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value of missing equipment. The trial court then trebled those damages, relying on the 
forcible detainer statute, Utah Code Ann., §78-36-10(3). The trial court also awarded 
Aris its attorney fees under the Lease. The trial court denied the claim for punitive 
damages, ruling that the actions of Wasatch and JDJ did not amount to a knowing and 
reckless indifference or disregard of Aris's rights. [R. 369-375] 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of Aris on March 12, 2004. [R. 474] 
Wasatch and JDJ filed a Notice of Appeal from that judgment on March 22, 2004. [R. 
477] Thereafter, on March 25, 2004, the trial court entered the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law proposed by Aris which the court had signed on March 18, 2004 and 
summarily overruled all of the objections of Wasatch and JDJ thereto. [R. 480] On March 
25, 2004, the court also entered an amended judgment that had been signed on March 18, 
2004, which increased by $3,613.00 the amount of attorney fees awarded in favor of Aris. 
[R. 505] 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In accordance with their obligation to marshal the evidence, JDJ and Wasatch set 
forth the relevant facts as follows: 
1. Aris is a California company that owned and operated a laser eye surgery center 
(the "Center") located in Suites 100 and 120 of the Woodlands Business Park Tower I in 
Murray, Utah (the "Premises"), that Aris leased from JDJ. [R. 409-410, Findings Nos. 1 
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& 6] The term of the Lease ran through July 31, 2006. [R. 528 at 381-382; Pi's Exs. 9 & 
11] 
2. Wasatch was a sister company of JDJ, and managed the Woodlands Towers 
building (the "Building") as JDJ's agent. [R. 410, Finding No. 8] 
3. Aris employed David Skalka ("Skalka") as the manager of the Center and 
contracted with four physicians (the "Doctors") on an independent contractor basis to 
perform eye surgeries at the Center. [R. 409, Finding No. 2] 
4. Aris owned all the equipment and furniture (collectively the "Equipment") 
located at the Center. [R. 527 at 234] 
Aris's Abandonment of the Premises 
5. The laser eye surgery market collapsed and on January 3, 2002 Aris decided to 
close all of its centers the next day, January 4, 2002, and file bankruptcy. All Aris 
employees, including Skalka, were terminated on January 4, 2002 and Aris ceased doing 
business in Utah on that date. [R. 526 at 38-39; R. 527 at 234-235 & 263-264] 
6. Over the weekend after January 4, 2002, Aris decided not to file bankruptcy. 
By January 7, 2002, Aris had decided to allow the Doctors to operate their own business 
at the Center while Aris attempted to come to terms with the Doctors on the purchase of 
the Equipment and assuming the Lease. On or about January 7, Aris initiated negotiation 
with the Doctors and agreed that they could use the Equipment and Premises while they 
negotiated. [R. 527 at 235-237] 
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7. Aris did not notify Wasatch or JDJ in advance that it was terminating its 
business or that it was turning over the Premises to the Doctors. [R. 212, ^ |1 8] 
8. Aris did not pay its January rent in the amount of $9,556.38 by January 1, 2002 
when it was due pursuant to the Lease. [R. 526 at 9-10] Pursuant to paragraph 18.3 of the 
Lease, interest at the rate of prime plus 5% and a 5% service fee were to be automatically 
added to any rent not paid within five days of the due date. [Ex. 9, TJ18.3] 
9. When Aris failed to pay rent, Wasatch sent out two notices that the rent was 
past due. Aris did not respond to the notices. [R. 528 at 384; Pi's Ex. 1, ^fl6] 
10. Through January 2002, while negotiations with Aris moved forward, the 
Doctors continued to occupy the Premises and performed surgeries on the Premises using 
Aris's Equipment. [R. 411, Finding No. 14] 
The Equipment 
11. Sometime after Aris terminated its operations, Wasatch's property manager, 
Dennis Peacock ("Peacock"), asked Skalka what was going on, Aris had not made the 
January rent payment. Skalka told him that he had been terminated by Aris and of Aris's 
financial trouble and provided copies of the notices he had received from Aris, which 
indicated that Aris had terminated Skalka's employment, was ceasing all operations and 
would likely file for bankruptcy protection. Peacock responded to Skalka that Aris's 
Equipment could not be removed from the Premises until Wasatch "found out what was 
going on with Aris." [R. 527 at 299-301; R. 411, Finding Nos. 15-18] 
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12. Paragraph 20.1 of the Lease provided in part: 
All moveable personal property of Tenant not removed from the premises 
upon the abandonment thereof (as defined at Title 78, Chapter 36 of the 
Utah Code Ann. or similar replacement provisions) or upon the termination 
of this Lease for any cause whatsoever shall conclusively be deemed to 
have been abandoned and may be appropriated, sold, stored, destroyed or 
otherwise disposed of by Landlord without notice to Tenant or any other 
person and without any obligation to account therefore. 
13. When the negotiations between Aris and Skalka and the Doctors proved 
unsuccessful, Aris directed that Richard Enright ("Enright"), its Director of Operations, 
come to Utah to determine if Skalka and the Doctors had any interest in purchasing and, if 
not, to remove the Equipment. [R. 526 at 36 & 39] Enright came to Utah without prior 
notice on January 22, 2002. [Id at 39 & 89] 
14. When Enright arrived at the Premises, he walked through the space with 
Skalka. [Id. at 41-42] There were certain rooms Skalka would not let him enter. [Id. at 83] 
The Doctors were preparing for surgeries that day. It was business as usual. Enright did 
not have a key to the Premises. Enright asked to do an inventory. Skalka said it would be 
pointless to do an inventory because Wasatch had seized the assets. Skalka did not give 
Enright permission to take the Equipment, but told him he would have to speak with 
Peacock, Wasatch's property manager at the building. [Id. at 41-42] 
15. Skalka took Enright downstairs to meet Peacock, introduced him to Peacock 
as Richard Enright from Aris Vision and told Peacock that Enright was there to remove 
the Equipment. Peacock said that the Equipment could not be removed because Aris had 
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abandoned the Premises and had defaulted under the Lease by failing to pay the January 
rent and that as a result, Wasatch had seized the Equipment. [R. 526 at 41-43; R. 413, 
Finding No. 26] 
16. Enright tendered a check for the rent, but Peacock refused to accept it. 
Peacock stated that it was too late, that Aris had abandoned the premises and that 
Wasatch was not taking Aris's money. Enright denied there had been an abandonment. 
[Id at 44-45; R. 415, Finding No. 27] 
17. Enright called Kathleen Soto ("Soto"), Aris's CFO, and told her what had 
occurred. Soto then spoke with Skalka and Peacock. Peacock told Soto that Aris had 
abandoned the Premises and had defaulted under the Lease by failing to pay its January 
rent. As a result, Peacock told Soto that Wasatch was entitled to seize Aris's personal 
property. [R. 413, Finding Nos. 28 & 29] Soto responded that Aris was pursuing its right 
under paragraph 20.1 of the Lease to remove its personal property before surrendering the 
Premises. [R. 413, Finding No. 30] Soto offered to pay the January rent immediately by 
wire transfer, but Peacock indicated it was too late and the payment would not be 
accepted. [Id, Finding No. 31] 
18. The check that Enright tendered did not include any amount for a late payment 
fee. [R. 527 at 262] 
19. Peacock told Enright that he needed to leave the Premises and threatened to 
have the police remove Enright if he did not leave. [R. 526 at 44-45] Enright left the 
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Premises without removing any Equipment. [R. 414, Finding No. 35] Enright and 
Peacock did not have a confrontation on January 22, but "basically a discussion". [R. 526 
at 76-77] 
20. During his visit, Enright requested a key from Skalka and then requested a key 
from Peacock. They both refused to give Enright a key. [Id. at 47] 
21. Aris then retained Erik Olson ("Olson") with the law firm of Durham, Jones & 
Pinegar, who filed (but did not serve) a Complaint on behalf of Aris on January 23, 2002, 
seeking replevin of the Equipment and damages for the refusal to give Aris the 
Equipment. [R. 414, Finding No. 37] 
22. On January 24, 2002, Olson talked with John A. Dahlstrom, Jr. ("Dahlstrom"), 
the Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Wasatch. Olson told Dahlstrom 
that Aris wanted to remove the Equipment and wanted access to the Premises to do so. 
Dahlstrom responded, "let's see if we can work out a deal". Dahlstrom was extremely 
professional. Dahlstrom proposed that Aris consider a "business solution" under which 
Aris would sell its Equipment to Skalka and the Doctors and they would assume the 
Lease. Aris agreed to pursue such an arrangement. [R. 526 at 153-155; R. 528 at 441-
442; R. 415, Finding No. 40] 
23. After Olson's initial discussions with Dahlstrom, Olson participated in a 
conference call with Skalka, one of the doctors and Wasatch's property managers. They 
talked about the possibility of the Doctors purchasing the Equipment and obtaining an 
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assignment of the Lease. The Doctors had a limit of approximately $2,000 a month on 
what they were willing to pay in rent so Aris would have had to chip in the balance. Aris 
was not willing to do so, but recognized that it was on the hook for some sort of ongoing 
monthly rent obligation. Olson told Wasatch and the Doctors to go back to the drawing 
board and come back with some other proposal. [R. 526 at 154-156] 
24. Olson wrote a January 25, 2002 letter to Dahlstrom tendering payment of the 
January rent. Wasatch did not respond to that tender. [R. 526 at 156-157; R. 527 at 217; 
Pi's Ex. 22] Olson never actually sent a check because there was no response to his letter. 
[R. 527 at 217] 
25. Aris did not pay rent for January 2002. Aris never paid any rent after 
December 2001. [R. 526 at 9-10] 
26. Olson acknowledged that between January 24 and February 15, 2002, the 
parties were mutually cooperating in an effort to move Skalka and the Doctors into the 
Premises. [R. 527 at 219-220] 
27. The Doctors moved out of the Premises on February 9, 2002 and moved into a 
smaller space in the Building. Wasatch did not supervise the move or retrieve the keys to 
the Premises. [R. 527 at 249-251 & Pi's Ex. 12; R. 416, Finding No. 46] Soto never 
asked Skalka to remove the Equipment after Enright left on January 22. [R. 527 at 330] 
28. No one from Wasatch or JDJ told any representative of Aris that Wasatch had 
been working with Skalka and the Doctors since 2001 to lease other space in the building 
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to the Doctors at a lower rent or that a new lease with the Doctors was consummated 
dated January 1, 2002 but signed sometime after January 22, 2002. [R. 415, Finding No. 
41; R. 527 at 307-308] 
29. When the Doctors vacated the Premises, Peacock changed the locks in part to 
safeguard the Equipment so that Skalka and the Doctors who had previous keys would no 
longer be able to have access to the Premises. Aris and Olson did not ask for a key and 
Peacock did not give Aris or Olson a key. [R. 527 at 189; 338 & 345]1 Wasatch did not 
advise Aris that the locks had been changed. [Finding No. 47 at R. 488] 
30. When Olson heard nothing further from Dahlstrom by mid-February (this was 
during the Olympics), Olson filed and served an Amended Complaint and also a motion 
for a writ of replevin for possession of the Equipment. [R. 526 at 157-159; Pi's Exs. 1 & 
2] 
31. Olson discussed the motion for writ of replevin with Dahlstrom a few times. 
Dahlstrom said that Wasatch would fight the motion and that Aris could not win, but even 
if it did, Aris would have to post an undertaking in the amount of hundreds of thousands 
of dollars. Dahlstrom said that Olson could not expect Wasatch to let all security just 
walk out the door leaving Wasatch holding the bag. [R. 526 at 160-161] 
1
 Peacock changed the locks a second time in June based upon instructions from 
Salt Lake County on a tax seizure notice. [R. 528 at 368] 
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32. The writ of replevin hearing was originally scheduled for February 26, 2002. 
At Dahlstrom's request, the hearing was rescheduled for March 5, 2002. [R. 526 at 161-162] 
33. Olson then cancelled the March 5 hearing. Olson testified he did so based 
upon Dahlstrom's statements that he would oppose the motion and there would be a large 
undertaking, but there was no evidence he told Dahlstrom his reason. Aris left the 
Equipment on the Premises. Olson and Dahlstrom agreed to work together to try to find a 
new tenant to reduce the damage claim against Aris. It was Olson's intent to try to reduce 
Aris's exposure and at the same time avoid having Aris having to file a large undertaking. 
Olson was aware that Aris had four and a half years remaining on a seven-year lease at 
approximately $20 a square foot. [R. 527 at 199; R. 528 at 470-471] 
34. The parties also agreed to put the litigation on hold while they worked 
together to find a new tenant. [R. 527 at 164-166; R. 528 at 470-471] In the seven 
months following February 15, Olson took no further action in court to prosecute the 
claims until after JDJ's Counterclaim was filed in October 2002. [R. 527 at 197] 
35. After January 22, 2002, there was never any occasion when Aris was denied 
access to the Premises or attempted to remove any Equipment from the Premises where 
Aris was restrained from doing so. [R. 526 at 13; R. 527 at 200-201] After March 5, 
2002, Peacock opened the Premises on several occasions so that Aris could inventory its 
Equipment and show the Premises to prospective tenants. [R. 526 at 12] 
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36. After March 5, Olson and Dahlstrom had subsequent conversations where they 
would catch up with each other about leads for replacement tenants. [R. 527 at 168] 
37. Within a week or two after March 5, Olson told Dahlstrom that Aris wanted 
access to the Premises for the purpose of inventorying the Equipment to make sure that 
nothing was damaged or missing. Dahlstrom agreed and had Olson make arrangements 
directly with Peacock. [R. 527 at 166-167] Dahlstrom told Peacock to let Aris in any 
time they asked and to be courteous and help in any way and cooperate. [R. 528 at 361-
362] 
38. On March 13, 2002, Enright did a physical inventory of the Equipment. Olson 
and Peacock were also present. Peacock supervised the visit. [R. 526 at 49-50] On that 
visit, Enright noticed that one of the lasers was damaged that had not been damaged when 
he was there on January 22 and that some of the Equipment was missing. [Id. at 53-54] 
Prior to March 2002, Enright did not know when the last time the inventory list had been 
reconciled with what was actually present on the Premises. [Id. at 109-110] When 
Enright was on the Premises on January 22, he saw most of the missing Equipment except 
the Intac equipment, items 899 through 911 of Exhibit 21 and the forceps. [Id. at 52-53] 
Sunglasses were also missing that had been there when he visited in January. [Id. at 59] 
Enright did not know if Skalka and the Doctors sold any sunglasses after January 22 or 
who took the sunglasses. [Id. at 72-73] 
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39. Olson arranged another visit to the Premises in mid-April 2002 for the purpose 
of showing Ed Barber the space. Mr. Barber was interested in perhaps leasing the space 
and perhaps purchasing some of the Equipment. The Barber visit occurred on April 19, 
2002. A week later Aris had another visit with Barber at the Premises. [R. 527 at 168-
169; R. 526 at 54-55 & 57] Peacock was also present during, and supervised, these visits. 
[Id. at 58] On the April 25 visit, Enright requested that Aris be allowed to remove one 
item of Equipment, a microkeratome, and Peacock agreed. [Id. at 62] 
40. Olson understood that the Equipment would have greater value in place if they 
could find a new tenant and that is why Aris was working with Barber in April and May 
to get him to not only buy the Equipment, but to move into the Premises. [R. 527 at 223] 
41. Sometime before May 20, 2002, Aris reached an agreement with Barber to 
purchase some of the Equipment for $35,000. [Id. at 171, 173 & 266] 
42. Aris worked with Barber for quite a while on taking over the Premises, but 
was unsuccessful. [Id. at 171-172] 
43. In late May or early June, 2002, Olson told Dahlstrom that Aris was not 
making much progress with getting Barber into the space. Olson turned Barber over to 
Dahlstrom and Wasatch in the hope that they could work something out with Barber to 
lease the Premises. [Id. at 172-173] 
44. On June 4, 2002, Olson wrote a letter to Dahlstrom in which he stated: 
As we have discussed over the phone on several occasions, it remains 
Aris's intention at the present time to postpone indefinitely the litigation of 
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the lawsuit Aris has filed against Wasatch including the motion for writ of 
replevin in hopes that either Aris or Wasatch can work together in good 
faith to find a new tenant to occupy the premises. In the meantime, Aris 
will leave its valuable equipment in the space. Aris's efforts to find a tenant 
should not be construed in any way to negate Wasatch's duty, if any, to 
mitigate the damages. [Id. at 173 & Pi's Ex. 24]2 
45. Olson and Enright went to the Premises with Barber on June 10, 2002 to close 
the Equipment sale. Olson talked with Dahlstrom who said he did not have authorization 
for Aris to remove the Equipment yet, but anticipated he could get it, but not in time to 
close the deal on that day. Olson then told Aris and Barber they were not able to proceed 
with the sale that day. [R. 527 at 175-177] 
46. The next day Olson talked with Dahlstrom who said Wasatch would only 
agree to the transaction if the $35,000 was paid to Wasatch. Olson said there was no way 
Aris would agree to that. Dahlstrom then said he would see if his client would be willing 
to take $10,000. [Id at 177-178] 
47. The Equipment sale to Barber was consummated on July 2, 2002. He did not 
ask for a discount because of the delay. [Id. at 264 & 266-267] 
48. Soto came to the Premises sometime after June 10 because she was frustrated 
with the process and was going to change the locks and take the Equipment. When she 
went inside the Premises there was a Salt Lake County property tax lien Notice of Seizure 
2
 Olson testified that he included in his letter the language about the Equipment 
staying on the Premises based upon the fact that the writ hearing had been cancelled so 
Aris was unable to remove the Equipment and that he did not intend to waive any claims. 
[Id at 173-174] 
17 
posted on the door so she did not go in. [Pi's Ex. 58] She cancelled the movers. The next 
morning Soto paid the taxes, but did not make any further effort to obtain the Equipment 
at that time. [R. 527 at 256-258] 
49. Approximately ten days later when Olson had not heard from Dahlstrom, he 
told Dahlstrom that Aris was going to go forward with the lawsuit and proceed with the 
motion for writ of replevin to get possession of the Equipment. Dahlstrom responded on 
approximately June 25 that Aris could go ahead and remove the Equipment. [Id. at 178-
179] The trial court found that Dahlstrom's instructions were a change from Wasatch's 
previous instructions not to allow Aris to remove the Equipment and that Wasatch refused 
to allow Aris to take the Equipment as a "bargaining chip" in Wasatch's negotiations with 
Aris over the paymein ui'rent. [R. 421, Finding No. 76; R. 4245 Finding No. 89] 
50. On July 2, 2002, Aris removed all of the Equipment from the Premises. [R. 
527 at 240] Two of the lasers were inoperable. [Id. at 251-252] 
JDJ's Lost Rental Damages 
51. Wasatch attempted to obtain another tenant for the Premises by advertising, by 
hiring Glen McKay to help in attempting to lease the space, and by also retaining Prime 
Commercial, a commercial real estate brokerage, to help lease the space. [R. 528 at 384-
385 & 393-394] 
52. JDJ signed a new Lease for the Premises with Utah Financial on July 24, 2002 
for a term commencing September 1, 2002. [Pi's Ex. 13] The new tenant paid less rent 
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than provided in the Aris Lease because of market conditions. [R. 528 at 395 & 397-398] 
In 1999, when Aris had entered into the Second Amendment to the Lease, the market was 
at its peak. Conditions changed drastically by January 2002. A lot of tenants had been 
lost. The market was very soft and it was a tenant's market. [Id. at 387-390; Pi's Ex. 64 
at 6-12] The new lease was for better than the market rate at the time. [Pi's Ex. 64 at 20] 
53. JDJ had to pay a commission on the Utah Financial lease of $16,088.40 to 
Prime Commercial. [R. 528 at 432-433] JDJ also had to agree to give the new tenant four 
months free rent to induce the tenant to rent the space. [Id. at 509-510] Because of 
market conditions, it was common to give a tenant free rent to induce a tenant to move 
into space. [Id at 515; Pi's Ex. 64 at 13-14] JDJ also had to pay $35,594.00 for tenant 
improvements to induce the new tenant to lease the Premises. [Id. at 515-516] The total 
amount of the rent differential between what Aris had agreed to pay and what the new 
tenant had agreed to pay was $136,273.06. Adding the commission and tenant 
improvements, the total differential was $174,561.57, after giving credit for the security 
deposit that Aris had paid. [Id. at 515-516 & Ex. 65] 
Aris's Claimed Damages 
54. After removing the Equipment from the Premises, Aris sold some of the 
Equipment to Jack Morris, an equipment liquidator out of Sacramento. The rest of the 
Equipment went to storage in Utah. Two of the three lasers were given back to VISX in 
settlement of Aris's debt to VISX secured by those lasers. The third mobile laser went to 
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storage in Utah until approximately three months before trial when it was sold. [R. 527 at 
240-241] 
55. Soto testified that two of the lasers were damaged so when Aris settled with 
VISX the amount of the credit which VISX gave for those lasers was reduced by $53,000. 
[Id at 252-253] 
56. Soto testified that VISX gave Aris a $60,000 credit for each of the two lasers 
it took back. She further testified that the third mobile laser was sold for $55,000. She 
did not know the sales price of any of the rest of the Equipment. She testified that the 
computer equipment and furniture and fixtures "probably" had not been sold. [Id. at 281-
283] 
57. Soto speculated that the damage to the lasers had to occur sometime after 
February 9, 2002 when the Doctors vacated the Premises because the Doctors were 
performing surgeries using those lasers. [Id. at 251-252] Soto did not know whether any 
of the Aris employees who were fired or any of the Doctors damaged the lasers as they 
moved out. [Id. at 288] Skalka did not know one way or another whether any of the 
lasers were broken when the Doctors moved out of the Center. [Id. at 329] 
58. There were missing items of Equipment. [Id. at 243] Enright did not know 
who took the missing Equipment or if Skalka or the Doctors took any of the Equipment 
when they moved out. [R. 526 at 108] The trial court awarded Aris $16,118.82 for the 
missing Equipment. [R. 494, Finding No. 80] 
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59. Richard Holdren ("Holdren") testified on behalf of Aris as its damage expert. 
Mr. Holdren appraises and sells medical practices and equipment. [R. 526 at 112] 
60. Holdren was asked to value the Equipment as of January 22, 2002 and as of a 
date approximately six months later to determine the difference in value. He used two 
different standard methodologies. First, he used a cost allocation method. Second, he 
used a market data approach based upon actual offers that Aris had received to buy 
equipment in other centers. [Id. at 117-118 & Ex. 51] 
61. In the cost approach, Holdren took the remaining useful life of the asset and 
the normal life and divided that times the cost to come up with the value. [R. 526 at 118] 
62. Holdren testified he used the cost allocation valuation method because this 
type of equipment depreciates very rapidly as there is a new machine coming out every 12 
to 18 months. [R. 526 at 118-119] 
63. In this regard, Soto testified that VISX had come out with a new generation 
S-3 laser that hit the market in the third or fourth quarter of 2001. The three lasers at the 
Center were S-2 lasers. [R. 527 at 243-244] Aris did not have any plans to pull those 
lasers out of the Center and replace them with new lasers because the S-3 is a software 
upgrade and you just put the upgrade in the laser at a cost of $75,000 to $100,000 per 
laser. Aris would have put the S-3 upgrade on at least one of the three lasers. When the 
lasers were obtained on July 2, Aris could have upgraded them at a cost of $75,000 a 
piece and the cost did not change from January 22. [Id. at 278-280] 
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64. In his market data approach, Holdren used bids made by doctors in other Aris 
Vision centers to purchase equipment. What Aris got in the way of offers was 50% of 
book value. [Id. at 120] 
65. Holdren averaged the remaining useful life of all Equipment. He had someone 
else in his office do this work. [R. 526 at 135-136] The remaining useful life of the 
Equipment was averaged out at three years even though the Equipment had different 
acquisition dates and different remaining lives. [Id. at 120-121: 135-136 & 150] 
66. Holdren then averaged the two valuation methods. The average loss was 
$118,568.81 and the daily loss was $755.22 for 157 days. [Id. at 121-122] 
67. Holdren testified that if he had done three different reports on the lasers rather 
than lumping them together, he would have come up with different figures but he was not 
asked to do that. [Id. at 150-151 ] 
68. Holdren did not know whether any of the Equipment was sold before he was 
hired to do the appraisals on September 30, 2003 and he had no idea what the sales price 
was for the Equipment. It would have been helpful in his analysis to know the prices for 
which the Equipment sold. [Id. at 126 & 128] 
69. Holdren acknowledged that the Equipment would have a much greater value 
in place in a functioning laser eye clinic than if it were taken out and sold piece by piece. 
[Id. at 148] 
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70. Holdren also included in his damage analysis a lost opportunity cost of 
$10,988.57 based upon what Aris could have earned by investing the money it lost. [Id. 
at 122] He assumed that Aris would have sold the Equipment on January 22, the same day 
that Enright attempted to pick up the Equipment. Moreover, if the money was not going 
to be invested by Aris, but was instead going to be paid to creditors, that would be a 
significant factor in calculating this purported item of damage. [Id. at 145-146] 
IV. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. As a matter of law, Aris abandoned the Premises by vacating the Premises 
without paying rent within 15 days of the January 1 due date and wrongfully giving 
possession of the Premises to the Doctors without the knowledge or consent of Wasatch 
or JDJ. JDJ is, therefore, entitled to recover lost rental damages in the amount of 
$174,561.57 plus attorney's fees incurred below and on appeal in this action. 
B. Even if Aris did not abandon the Premises, Aris is not entitled to recover for 
forcible detainer as a matter of law because it was not in possession of the Premises 
within five days of the alleged forcible detainer which supposedly occurred on January 
22, 2002, or when Wasatch later changed the locks after the Doctors vacated. Further, as 
of January 22, the Doctors were in possession of the Premises operating their own 
business and utilizing the Equipment. Aris was not entitled to take possession of the 
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Premises or Equipment by self-help and Wasatch and JDJ had no right or power to allow 
Aris to do so. Neither Wasatch nor JDJ held or kept possession of the Premises by force 
or by menaces or threats of violence or unlawfully entered the Premises and refused for 
three days to surrender the Premises. At most, Aris only wanted to remove the 
Equipment. It did not want to occupy the Premises. JDJ had a contractual right under the 
Lease to the Equipment and also a lessor's lien on the Equipment for at least 30 days after 
January 4, 2002, when Aris vacated the Premises, and was, therefore, not obligated to 
allow Aris to take the Equipment while the lien existed. Finally, Aris had no right to 
recover for forcible detainer because it was not seeking restitution of the Premises. The 
forcible detainer statute should be strictly construed and does not apply to a claimed 
withholding of personal property, especially after a tenant has vacated the Premises. 
Similarly, Aris was not entitled to recover for wrongful eviction because it had vacated 
the Premises long before the claimed wrongful eviction. 
C. Aris was not entitled to recover for conversion of the Equipment because when 
the alleged conversion took place on January 22, 2002, Aris had abandoned the Premises. 
JDJ, therefore, had the contractual right under paragraph 20.1 of the Lease to retain and 
dispose of the Equipment. JDJ also had a lessor's lien on the Equipment at that date and, 
therefore, had no obligation to allow Aris to take the Equipment. Thereafter, Aris agreed 
to work together with Wasatch and JDJ to sell the Equipment and re-let the Premises and 
impliedly waived any conversion claim. Aris made no affirmative demand for possession 
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of the Equipment and did not inform Wasatch or JDJ that it was agreeing to work together 
involuntarily or that Aris intended to hold them liable if it was not given immediate 
possession. 
D. The damage award is clearly erroneous because Aris failed to prove it suffered 
any damages by virtue of the fact the Equipment remained on the Premises. The evidence 
was also insufficient to prove depreciation of the lasers because the new technology that 
supposedly caused the depreciation had already hit the market when the alleged 
conversion of the Equipment took place and the new technology was simply a software 
upgrade to the Equipment. The methodology of Aris's damage expert was also fatally 
defective because he simply took an average useful life of all remaining Equipment in 
determining the value rather than using the remaining useful life of a particular item of 
Equipment in valuing that item. Aris was also not entitled to recover damages because it 
failed to prove the amount for which it sold the Equipment and its damages could not 
have exceeded the difference between the value of the Equipment on January 22 and the 
amount for which the Equipment was sold. Wasatch and JDJ are not liable for the 
missing or damaged Equipment because Aris failed to prove that the missing Equipment 
was on the Premises after the Doctors vacated on February 9, 2002 or the value of one 
item of missing equipment or that the damaged lasers were damaged after the Doctors 
vacated. Finally, Aris was not entitled to recover lost opportunity damages based on what 
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Aris could have earned by investing the money it lost because there was no legal basis for 
such an award and the evidence did not support the award. 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
A. ARIS ABANDONED THE PREMISES WITHOUT PAYING RENT AND 
TURNED OVER POSSESSION TO THE DOCTORS. THUS BREACHING THE 
LEASE. FOR WHICH BREACH JDJ IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES 
ON ITS COUNTERCLAIM. 
On January 4, 2002, Aris abruptly terminated all of its business at the Center (as 
well as throughout the country) without paying the January rent and fired all of its Utah 
employees. By January 7, Aris turned over possession of the Premises to the Doctors to 
operate their own business. Aris vacated the Premises and turned over possession to the 
Doctors without any notice to Wasatch or JDJ and without their knowledge or consent. 
Utah Code Ann., §78-36-12.3, provides: 
"Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following situations: 
(a) the tenant has not notified the owner that he or she will be absent from 
the premises, and the tenant fails to pay rent within 15 days after the due 
date, and there is no reasonable evidence other than the presence of the 
tenant's personal property that the tenant is occupying the premises . . . 
By vacating the Premises and turning possession over to the Doctors without any notice to 
JDJ and without paying rent within 15 days of the due date, Aris abandoned the Premises 
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as a matter of law. See State of Utah v. Hawkins, 967 P.2d at 970; Fashion Place Assocs. 
v. Glad Rags, Inc., 754 P.2d 940, 941 (Utah 1988) ("§78-36-12.3 defines 'abandonment' 
as vacating the premises without notice by the tenant to the landlord"). 
In this regard, under paragraph 11.1 of the Lease, Aris had no right to assign or 
sublet the Premises or to allow any other person to use or occupy the Premises without 
JDJ's prior written consent. [Plf s Ex. 9] Paragraph 11.2 of the Lease further provided 
that any assignment or subletting without JDJ's consent constituted a default under the 
Lease, giving JDJ the right to terminate the Lease. Thus, Aris not only abandoned the 
Premises, but also breached the Lease by giving occupancy of the Premises to the Doctors 
without JDJ's written consent. 
Aris argued, and the trial court found, that on January 22 Aris tendered the January 
rent to Wasatch. However, the tender of rent 18 days after the Premises were abandoned 
could not retroactively abrogate the previous abandonment. Nor could that late tender 
nullify the fact that Aris had turned over possession of the Premises to the Doctors by 
January 7 in violation of the Lease. JDJ had no obligation to accept rent after Aris 
abandoned the Premises and after the Lease was terminated.3 
3
 Soto testified that on January 22 she told Wasatch's Peacock that Aris was 
exercising its right to remove its equipment before surrendering the Premises. [R. 527 at 
247] In other words, Aris did not want to reoccupy the Premises it had vacated on 
January 4, but only to remove its Equipment. Cf Martinez v. Steinbaum, 623 P.2d 49, 53 
(Colo. 1981) ("It can be inferred from the record that the appellant intended to abandon 
the lease and that his concern was limited to the fate of his possessions"). This testimony 
does not get around the fact that on January 4 Aris had vacated the Premises without 
notice and without paying rent and then turned possession over to the Doctors, which 
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Moreover, the tender was insufficient because the check that the court found was 
tendered did not include interest or a 5% late fee. [SOF No. 18] See Shields v. Harris, 934 
P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1997) (". . . a valid tender requires an 'obligor [to] make a bona 
fide, unconditional, offer of payment of the amount of money due coupled with an actual 
production of the money or its equivalent'"); Home Savings of America, FSB v. Isaacson, 
659 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1997) (tender insufficient because debtor did not tender all interest and 
late charges). 
When Aris abandoned the Premises, JDJ had the right to "retake the premises and 
attempt to rent them at a fair rental value." Utah Code Ann., §78-36-12.6(1). Aris 
remained liable for rent that accrued during the time necessary to re-let the premises, and 
for the difference between the fair rental value and the rent agreed to by Aris plus a 
reasonable commission for renting the premises. Id. 
After Aris abandoned the Premises, Wasatch and JDJ properly attempted to relet 
the Premises at market rates. These efforts resulted in a new lease with Utah Financial 
entered into on July 24, 2002 for a lease commencing September 1, 2002 at higher than 
market rate. JDJ had to pay $35, 594.00 for tenant improvements and a real estate 
commission of $16,088.40. [SOF Nos. 51-52] Aris is liable for these costs incurred to 
find a new tenant. See Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 907 (Utah 1989) 
constituted an abandonment. 
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(a landlord is entitled to recover costs reasonably incurred in re-letting property, including 
reasonably necessary alterations). 
The total amount of the rent differential between what Aris had agreed to pay and 
what the new tenant agreed to pay was $136,273.06. Adding the commission and tenant 
improvements, and after giving credit to Aris for its security deposit, JDJ's total damages 
were $174,561.57. [SOF No. 53] JDJ is entitled to recover these damages from Aris. In 
addition, pursuant to paragraph 26.17 of the Lease, JDJ is entitled to recover its 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in this action both below and on appeal. 
B. ARIS IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER FOR FORCIBLE DETAINER 
OR WRONGFUL EVICTION AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Under the trial court's decision, Aris not only escaped any liability for its clear 
breach of the Lease, but was awarded treble damages for forcible detainer and a judgment 
for wrongful eviction even though Aris had ceased business operations and had no desire 
or ability to occupy the Premises and the parties were acting cooperatively for months to 
mitigate JDJ's damages by finding a new tenant. The trial court's rulings in this regard 
were incorrect as a matter of law and should be reversed. 
1. Forcible Detainer. 
Even if it were assumed for argument that Aris did not abandon the Premises 
(which it did), Aris was not entitled to recover under the forcible detainer statute. Thus, 
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the award of treble damages was error as a matter of law. Utah Code Ann., §78-36-2, 
defines "forcible detainer" as follows: 
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who either: 
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds and 
keeps the possession to any real property, whether the same was acquired 
peaceably or otherwise; or, 
(2) in the nighttime, or during the absence of the occupants of any real 
property, unlawfully enters thereon, and, after demand made for the 
surrender thereof refuses for the period of three days to surrender the same 
to such former occupant. The occupant of real property within the meaning 
of this subdivision is one who within five days preceding such unlawful 
entry was in the peaceable and undisturbed possession of such lands. 
[Emphasis Added] 
Axis failed to prove a forcible detainer under this statute for a number of reasons. 
First, Aris failed to prove that it was in possession of the Premises within five days 
preceding the alleged forcible detainer as required by the statute. See Freeway Park 
Bldg} Inc. v. Western States Wholesale Supply, 451 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1969). Aris 
contended that the forcible detainer occurred when Wasatch's Peacock told Aris's Enright 
on January 22, 2002 that he could not remove the Equipment being used by the Doctors 
from the Premises then occupied by the Doctors. [See, e.g.. Pre Trial Order, TJ2(a) at R. 
167] However, as of January 22, Aris had not been in possession of the Premises since 
January 4, 2002, 18 days earlier. 
Wangsgardv. Fitzpatrick. 542 P.2d 194 (Utah 1975), is closely on point. In 
Wangsgard, the tenant had some equipment on the leased premises which the tenant sold 
to a third party along with the business being operated on the premises. The third party 
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later vacated the premises and defaulted on his purchase of the equipment from the 
tenant. The owners of the premises changed the locks and the tenant could not remove 
his equipment. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the tenant's forcible entry and 
detainer and wrongful eviction claims because the tenant was not in actual possession of 
the premises at the time of the alleged forcible detainer and wrongful eviction, but had 
previously transferred whatever possessory interest the tenant had to the third party. See 
also Frisco Joes, Inc. v. Peay, 558 P.2d 1327, 1329-1330 (Utah 1977) (If a tenant has 
abandoned or surrendered the premises and is therefore not in actual and peaceable 
possession, no claim exists for forcible entry). 
Likewise, in the case at bar, Aris had turned over possession of the Premises to the 
Doctors by January 7, 2002. Aris was not in actual possession of the Premises after 
January 4, 2002. Therefore, Aris had no claim for forcible detainer (or wrongful 
eviction). 
Second, as of January 22, the Doctors were in possession of the Premises, 
operating their own business on the Premises and utilizing the Equipment in the operation 
of their business. Aris had no right to take back possession of the Premises or the 
Equipment being utilized by the Doctors on the Premises by self-help. Instead, Aris was 
required to serve a Notice to Quit upon the Doctors and/or file an appropriate lawsuit to 
obtain possession. See Freeway Park Bldg., 451 P.2d at 781. For the same reason, 
Wasatch and JDJ had no right or power to allow Aris to take the Equipment in the 
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possession of the Doctors. Thus, Peacock's refusal to allow Aris to take the Equipment 
from the Doctors was not wrongful. 
Third, there was no evidence that Wasatch or JDJ held or kept possession of the 
Premises "by force, or by menaces and threats of violence" or that they unlawfully 
entered on the Premises and refused for three days to surrender the Premises to Aris. Aris 
never made demand for "surrender" of the Premises. At most, all the evidence 
demonstrated was that Aris wanted to remove the Equipment from the Premises. Aris had 
vacated the Premises on January 4 when it terminated its business operations. Aris had 
no employees in Utah; Aris had no business in Utah; and Aris had no use for the 
Premises. The refusal of Wasatch and JDJ to allow Aris to take the Equipment from the 
Premises as found by the trial court was not a forcible detainer of real property. 
Fourth, pursuant to paragraph 20.1 of the Lease, when Aris abandoned the 
Premises on January 4, 2002, all personal property was conclusively deemed to have been 
abandoned and JDJ had the contractual right to appropriate, sell, store or dispose of the 
Equipment. In Kurc v. Herren, 396 S.E.2d 62, 63-64 (Ga. 1990) the court upheld such a 
provision, stating that" any of appellant's personalty that remained on the premises was 
'abandoned' as a matter of contract law notwithstanding appellant's subjective intent to 
the contrary." To the same effect, see City of St. Peters v. Hill, 9 S.W.3d 652, 655-656 
(Mo. 2000). Although as part of the parties' cooperative efforts, JDJ permitted Aris to 
attempt to sell the Equipment while on the Premises and ultimately allowed Aris to 
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remove the Equipment, JDJ was not obligated to do so and JDJ's refusal to permit Aris to 
earlier remove the Equipment as found by the court was not wrongful. 
Fifth, as of January 22, JDJ had a lessor's lien on all of the Equipment pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann., §38-3-1, which provides: 
Except as hereinafter provided, lessors shall have a lien for rent due upon 
all non-exempt property of the lessee brought or kept upon the leased 
premises so long as the lessee shall occupy said premises and for 30 days 
thereafter. [Emphasis Added] 
Because Aris vacated and abandoned the Premises on January 4, JDJ's lessor's lien 
continued in existence for 30 days thereafter without any necessity for JDJ to commence 
action to foreclose the lien. See Citizens Bank v. Elks Building, 663 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 
1983). JDJ had the right to refuse to allow Aris to take the Equipment during that 30-day 
period. JDJ's refusal to allow Aris to take the Equipment on January 22 was, therefore, 
not wrongful. Citizens Bank, 663 P.2d at 58. Thus, in Eason v. Wheelock, 120 P.2d 319, 
320 (Utah 1941), the Supreme Court held that the landlord did not convert the tenant's 
property by withholding that property from the tenant during the 30-day period after the 
tenant vacated the premises because the lessor's lien was in effect during that period of 
time. 
In this regard, the trial court found that: 
There is no credible evidence that Aris ever vacated the Premises prior to 
January 22, 2002 Rather, Aris's personal property remained on the 
Premises, and Skalka and the doctors continued to occupy the Premises 
until February 9, 2002." [R. 496, Finding No. 90] 
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As demonstrated above, this finding is clearly wrong because as a matter of law Aris did 
in fact vacate and abandon the premises on January 4. However, even if this finding were 
correct, Aris was still not entitled to prevail on its forcible detainer claim. If Aris was 
deemed to be in possession of the Premises until the Doctors vacated on February 9, then 
JDJ's lessor's lien on the Equipment remained in effect for 30 days thereafter, or until 
March 11, 2002. It is undisputed that at least after March 5, 2002 the parties were 
working together to attempt to re-let the Premises. [R. 527 at 199; R. 417, Finding No. 
52] Aris was attempting to sell the Equipment on the Premises to a new tenant. [SOF Nos. 
35-39] Aris and its own expert recognized that the Equipment had substantially more 
value "in place" than if removed from the Premises and sold. Olson testified that is why 
Aris was trying during April and May to sell the Equipment to Barber and have him 
assume the Lease. [SOF No. 40] Indeed, on June 4, 2002, Olson wrote Dahlstrom, stating 
that Aris had postponed the litigation so the parties could work together to find a new 
tenant and that Aris was leaving the Equipment at the Premises, but that JDJ was not 
excused from mitigating its damages. [SOF No. 44] There is no evidence that after 
March 11, 2002 Aris made any demand to remove Equipment from the Premises except 
for the one piece of Equipment it was allowed to take in April, 2002 and the few items of 
Equipment Aris agreed to sell to Barber for $35,000 and wanted to remove on June 10, 
2002. Aris suffered no damage with respect to the Barber Equipment because that sale 
was consummated for the same $35,000 amount on July 2, 2002. 
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Sixth, Aris had no right to recover for forcible detainer because it was not seeking 
restitution of the Premises. Under Utah Code Ann., §78-36-10(1), a judgment for forcible 
detainer "shall include an order for the restitution of the premises as provided in Section 
78-36-10.5." [Emphasis Added] See Freeway Park Bldg., 451 P.2d at 275 (the case was 
not for forcible entry or detainer because restitution of the premises was not sought, but 
was instead for the separate tort of wrongful eviction). Aris did not seek restitution of the 
Premises at trial and no such relief was granted. Aris did not even seek any damages on 
the basis it had not been able to occupy and use the Premises for the obvious reason that 
Aris had no use for the Premises. Aris only sought damages it claimed to have suffered 
because it had not been permitted to take its Equipment from the Premises. 
The treble damages penalty provided by the forcible detainer statute is a drastic 
remedy to discourage landlords from forcibly dispossessing tenants of their possession of 
real property. The statute should be strictly construed. Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 393 P.2d 
468, 470 (Utah 1964). Cf. Keller v. Southwood North Medical Pavilion, 959 P.2d 102, 
108 (Utah 1998) (forcible entry statute only applies to types of property people can 
occupy). See also Gibby's Inc. v. Aylett, 615 P.2d 949, 951 (Nev. 1980). A landlord's act 
in withholding a tenant's personal property is distinct from the act of forcibly detaining 
real property a tenant is occupying. A tenant is relegated to an action for conversion and 
replevin with respect to personal property. The forcible detainer statute simply does not 
apply to a landlord's claimed wrongful withholding of personal property, especially after 
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a tenant has vacated and abandoned the premises. The imposition of the treble damages 
penalty would be even more incongruous in the case at bar where the parties cooperated 
for months in attempting to find a replacement tenant and Aris had no desire or ability to 
occupy the Premises. 
Aris argued below, and the trial court found, that in addition to forcibly detaining 
the Equipment on January 22, Wasatch and JDJ also forcibly detained the Equipment 
when Peacock changed the locks after the Doctors vacated on February 9. However, 
Aris had long before voluntarily vacated and abandoned the Premises and wrongfully 
turned possession of the Premises over to the Doctors. When the locks were changed on 
February 9, Aris had not occupied or operated a business on the Premises for over a 
month. Further, Aris did not have keys to the Premises even before the locks were 
changed so the changing of the locks did not dispossess Aris and had no effect 
whatsoever on Aris's ability to occupy the Premises. Finally, after the locks were 
changed, Aris did not request occupancy of the Premises or keys to the Premises. Aris 
was given access to the Premises any time it requested for the purpose of inspecting and 
inventorying the Equipment and showing it to prospective purchasers. [SOF Nos. 29 & 
35] 
2. Wrongful Eviction. 
Similarly, because Aris had vacated and abandoned the Premises on January 4 and 
then turned over possession of the Premises to the Doctors, thereby breaching the Lease, 
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and thereafter never sought to occupy the Premises, the trial court's ruling that Wasatch 
and JDJ committed the separate tort of wrongful eviction on January 22 and thereafter 
cannot stand. Simply put, Aris was not in possession of the Premises when the alleged 
wrongful eviction occurred and did not even want to occupy the Premises. See 
Wangsgard v. Fitzpatrick, supra. 
For all these reasons, the judgment of treble damages for forcible detainer and the 
judgment of wrongful eviction should be reversed. 
C. WASATCH AND JDJ DID NOT CONVERT THE EQUIPMENT. 
The trial court also ruled that Wasatch and JDJ converted the Equipment by 
refusing to allow Aris to take possession of it. [R. 427, Conclusion No. 8] This ruling was 
in error because when the alleged conversion took place on January 22, 2002, Aris had 
abandoned the Premises and JDJ therefore had the contractual right under paragraph 20.1 
of the Lease to retain and dispose of the Equipment, as demonstrated above. 
Further, as discussed earlier, JDJ had a lessor's lien on the Equipment and 
therefore had no obligation to allow Aris to take the Equipment. After the lessor's lien 
expired, Aris made no demand for possession of the Equipment.4 Aris only requested 
4
 Although after the doctors vacated on February 9 Olson informed Dahlstrom that 
Aris was going to proceed with the lawsuit and noticed a hearing on its motion for writ of 
replevin, Aris did not at that time make a demand that the Equipment be released without 
Aris proceeding with the writ of replevin motion. More importantly, it is undisputed that 
Aris then agreed to cancel the writ of replevin hearing and put the lawsuit on hold while 
the parties jointly attempted to re-let the Premises in order to mitigate damages. [SOF 
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access to the Premises for the purpose of inspecting and inventorying the Equipment and 
showing the Equipment to prospective purchasers. Wasatch gave Aris access to the 
Equipment each time a request was made. Aris left the Equipment on the Premises and 
tried to sell it to a new tenant. [SOF Nos. 35 & 39] Aris understood the Equipment had 
more value in place and during April and May Aris admittedly was attempting to obtain 
an agreement with Barber to assume the Lease and purchase the Equipment. [SOF No. 
40] 
Eason v. Wheelock, supra is directly on point. In Eason, the tenant alleged that the 
landlord had converted the Equipment by refusing to give possession of the Equipment to 
the tenant over a four month period. The Supreme Court reversed a judgment for 
conversion against the landlord because all affirmative acts of conversion took place in 
the 30 days after the tenant vacated the premises, during which time the lessor's lien was 
still in effect, observing:. 
It was during the following 30 days [after tenant vacated the premises], 
as given by our statute that all affirmative acts of alleged conversion took 
place insofar as the Defendant Wheelock may be concerned. Any act after 
that date would be one of withholding the property. There is no allegation 
by the Plaintiffs of a conversion based on a demand made after a reasonable 
time had elapsed in which to foreclose the lien, and a subsequent refusal by 
the railroad company to surrender the property. 120 P.2d at 320. 
Nos. 32-34] And, if Aris were deemed in possession of the Premises until the Doctors 
vacated on February 9, the lessor's lien did not expire until March 11, after which there 
was no demand for possession except with respect to the Barber equipment. 
38 
In this regard, Judge Lewis found that Aris did not intend to waive, settle or 
release any claims in this action by agreeing to cancel the replevin hearing, leaving the 
Equipment on the Premises and cooperating to find a new tenant, but did so because of 
JDJ's opposition to the replevin and insistence on a sizeable bond. [R. 489, Finding Nos. 
52 & 53] However, waiver is based upon Aris's objective intent, not its secret subjective 
intent. See, e.g., Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 243 
(2nd Cir. 1996); Rothner v. City of Chicago, 879 F.2d 1402, 1417 (7th Cir. 1989). Aris 
should not be entitled to recover for conversion where it agreed that the parties would 
cooperate to lease the Premises and the parties proceeded to attempt to sell the Equipment 
to a new tenant. Olson did not tell Dahlstrom that the only reason he was agreeing to do 
so was to avoid putting up a large bond to obtain the Equipment. Aris's secret reason for 
agreeing to jointly cooperate to find a new tenant is irrelevant. The fact is that Aris 
admittedly agreed to do so. 
Moreover, apart form the issue of waiver, a plaintiff seeking to impose conversion 
liability on another party should be required to make a clear demand for possession of the 
property and then stand on that demand. At the very least, when Aris agreed that the 
parties would cooperate to find a new tenant, Aris was required to clearly notify Wasatch 
and JDJ that it was doing so involuntarily and intended to hold them liable if possession 
of the Equipment was not immediately given to Aris. 
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Finally, when Aris sought to obtain possession of the Equipment on January 22, it 
was in the Doctors' possession and not in the possession of Wasatch or JDJ. Aris had no 
right to repossess the Equipment through self-help and the fact that Wasatch would not 
agree that Aris could take the Equipment from the Doctors did not legally constitute a 
conversion. 
For all these reasons, the judgment for conversion should be reversed. 
D. THE DAMAGE AWARD TO ARIS SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
1. Aris Failed to Prove That it Suffered Any Damages Because the 
Equipment Remained on the Premises. 
Aris claimed that it suffered $118,568.81 in damages because the Equipment 
depreciated in that amount during the period of time it remained on the Premises. 
However, Aris failed to prove that it could not have sold the Equipment during the time it 
remained on the Premises or that the fact that the Equipment remained on the Premises 
interfered with Aris's ability to sell the Equipment. Aris admittedly jointly attempted to 
sell the Equipment from the Premises to a new tenant or other party. 
The only evidence that Aris presented in this regard was Soto's wholly conclusory 
testimony that Aris "had several buyers already lined up" to purchase the three lasers that 
fell away because Aris could not produce the lasers. [R. 527 at 240] Soto did not testify 
who these "several buyers" were or that Aris had reached any agreement with any of these 
"several buyers" to purchase any of the lasers or to the terms of any agreement or when 
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the "several buyers fell away". Indeed, in her February 15, 2002 affidavit, Soto only 
testified that she was negotiating "with several potential buyers" regarding sale of the 
Equipment and that the Equipment would likely sell for approximately $550,000 which 
was far less than Aris owed to creditors secured by the Equipment. [Pi's Ex. 5, ^fl8] 
Further, Enright testified that he was instructed by Aris to come to Utah on January 
22 to determine if the Doctors had any interest in purchasing the Equipment and, if not, to 
remove the Equipment. [SOF No. 13] Obviously, then, Aris could not have had any 
agreements with other buyers as of January 22 to purchase the Equipment. In addition, 
there was no evidence that Aris notified Wasatch or JDJ of any purported buyers or 
requested that Aris be given possession of the lasers to deliver to these buyers. 
Aris presented no evidence that it could not have sold the lasers or any of the other 
Equipment from the Premises. Aris was given access to the Equipment any time it 
requested in order to show the Equipment to prospective purchasers and was attempting 
to sell the Equipment. Indeed, Aris entered into an agreement with Barber while the 
Equipment was located on the Premises to sell him certain pieces of Equipment for 
$35,000.00. And, when the Equipment was removed from the Premises, some of the 
Equipment, including the mobile laser, was put in storage in Utah until it was sold. [R. 
527 at 241] That laser presumably could have been sold from the Premises just as easily 
as it was sold from storage. Aris made an agreement with VISX to return the other two 
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lasers for a credit against the amount owed by Aris to VISX. [SOF Nos. 54-55] That 
agreement was reached while the Equipment was on the Premises. [R. 527 at 241] 
2. The Evidence Was Insufficient to Prove Depreciation of the Lasers. 
The vast majority of the alleged depreciation in value of the Equipment during the 
time it was on the Premises was with respect to the three lasers. Soto testified that these 
lasers lost a substantial portion of their value because they were S-2 lasers and that during 
the third or fourth quarter of 2001 new S-3 lasers were introduced on the market. [SOF 
No. 63] 
Soto testified, however, that the S-3 technology was simply a software upgrade to 
the S-2 laser that could be installed on each laser at a cost of $75,000 to $100,000 and 
that this cost did not increase during the time the lasers were on the Premises. [Id.] Thus, 
there was no evidence that there was any loss in value with respect to these lasers. All 
Aris had to do was upgrade the lasers with the S-3 software. Aris would have had to do 
this whether it obtained possession of the lasers on January 22 or July 2, when it actually 
obtained possession of the lasers. Further, depreciation because of the new S-3 
technology had presumably already occurred as of January 22, 2002 because the new 
technology had hit the market in the third or fourth quarter of 2001. [Id.] 
3. Holdren's Methodology in Valuing the Equipment Was Fatally Defective. 
In reaching his valuation of the Equipment using both the cost approach and the 
market data approach, Holdren took an average of the estimated remaining useful life of 
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all the Equipment of three years to value individual items of Equipment, rather than 
basing his valuation of an item on the specific remaining useful life of that item. [SOF 
No. 65] Holdren acknowledged that the Equipment was acquired at different dates and 
had different remaining useful lives. [Id.] Holdren also admitted that if he had determined 
the value of an individual item by using the remaining useful life of that specific item of 
Equipment, his calculation of value would have been different. [SOF No. 67] 
Thus, Holdren5s methodology was fatally defective. By averaging the remaining 
useful life of all the Equipment, the values were misstated. For example, if hypothetically 
a $100,000 piece of equipment had a remaining useful life of one year and a $500 piece 
of equipment had a remaining useful life of 10 years, Holdren simply calculated an 
average remaining useful life of five years, which would substantially overstate the value 
of the $100,000 piece of equipment, and thus overstate the damages suffered. An 
estimate of damages must be based on relevant data. See Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, 
Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 748 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah App. 1989). Holdren's estimate of 
damages based on average remaining useful life of all Equipment did not satisfy this 
requirement. 
4. Aris Failed to Prove the Amount For Which It Sold the Equipment. 
Most of the Equipment was sold by Aris before Holdren did his valuation of the 
Equipment. Obviously, the damages recoverable by Aris could not exceed the difference 
between the value of the Equipment on January 22 and the amount for which Aris 
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ultimately sold the Equipment. Aris failed to prove the amount for which the Equipment 
was sold other than one laser that was sold for $55,000, the two lasers that were returned 
to VISX for a credit against the amount owed by Aris and the Equipment sold to Barber 
for $35,000. Thus, the damage award must be reversed. 
5. Wasatch and JDJ Are Not Liable for the Missing or Damaged Equipment. 
(a) The Missing Equipment. 
Aris claimed damages of $16,118.82 for certain items of the Equipment that it 
I 
claimed were present on the Premises on January 22, but were missing after the Doctors 
vacated the Premises on February 9. However, there was no evidence that these items 
were located on the Premises after the Doctors vacated on February 9. Enright admitted 
he did not know who took the missing Equipment or if Skalka or the Doctors or their 
employees took any of the Equipment when they moved out. [SOF No. 58] It was pure 
speculation as to whether the Doctors, Skalka or other fired employees removed these 
items on or before February 9, or whether the items were removed by someone after that 
date. Aris had the burden of proving the fact, causation and amount of damages with 
reasonable certainty. Speculative damages are not recoverable. Price-Orem Inv. Co., 784 
P.2d at 478. See also Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 71 P.3d 188, 200-201 (Utah App. 
2003). Wasatch and JDJ are certainly not responsible if Equipment was taken before the 
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Doctors vacated and Peacock changed the locks. It was Aris that gave possession of the 
Equipment to the Doctors.5 
(b) The Damaged. Lasei s. 
Similarly, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Aris in the amount of 
$53,000.00 for damage supposedly done to two of the lasers while in the possession of 
before the Doctors and their employees vacated and Peacock changed the locks. The only 
evidence to support any claim that Wasatch and JDJ are responsible for that damage is 
Soto's speculation that tl le damage i x sometime ai ter February 9 
when the Doctors vacated the Premises because the Doctors were performing surgeries 
using those lasers. However, Soto admitted that she did not know whether any of the Aris 
employees who were fired or any of the Doctors damaged the lasers as they moved out. 
[SOI Mn •« I I I in 11 i^ii1- IJI 11 MI (I I i i n in | mi I I HI ill ili in ill 11 in in. iii) III il • **^e 
damaged after the Doctors vacated. 
5
 In addition, there was no evidence to support the value the trial court gave to the 
missing Hansatome Microkeratome piece of equipment that constituted the bulk of the value of 
the missing Equipment. There were two Hansatome Microkeratomes on the Premises in addition 
to the one that Aris took from the Premises in April, 2002. Enright did not know which of these 
two items was missing. [R. 526 at 88] In Holdren's expert report [Plf s Ex. 51], he gave one of 
these items (Item #2091) a book value of $5,637.08 as of June 27, 2002, and the other item (Item 
#1137) a book value of $14,164.68 as of that date. Without any evidentiary support, Aris argued 
for, and the court awarded, the higher figure for Item #1137. Because Aris failed to prove which 
item was missing, at most Aris would only be entitled to recover the lower value of Item #2091 
of $5,637.08. Thus, the judgment would have to be reduced by the difference of $8,527.60. 
6. Aris Was Not Entitled to Recover Lost Opportunity Damages. 
Finally, the trial court awarded lost opportunity damages with respect to the value 
of the Equipment based upon Holdren's testimony that Aris lost $10,988.57 that it could 
have earned by investing money derived from the sale of the Equipment on January 22, 
2002. This item of damage was improperly awarded for three reasons. 
First, there was no legal basis for an award of damages based upon what Aris 
could have theoretically earned by investing money. If anything, Aris was only entitled to 
recover interest on its claimed damages if the damages were liquidated, which they were 
not. Prejudgment interest, where available, is intended to compensate a plaintiff for the 
lost opportunity to use the money. See United States v. Gaechter Outdoor Advertising, 
Inc., 221 F.3d 1353, 2000 W.L. 985863 at **9 (10th Cir. 2000). Second, Holdren 
assumed that all of the Equipment would have been sold on January 22, 2002, the very 
day that Aris first attempted to take possession of the Equipment. [SOF No. 70] There 
was no evidence to support that assumption. Third, Holdren assumed that Aris would 
have invested the money. [Id. ] To the contrary, the testimony was that Aris was 
liquidating the Equipment and applying the proceeds from the sale of the Equipment to 
pay creditors. [R. 526 at 36] 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
I 'Oi all of tl ic: foregoing reasons, the judgment K. ia\ v. c\ \->... should be reversed 
and the case r emanded with instructions to enter judgmcn- '" ., • s 
Counterc la im and against Aris on its Amended Complaint In the al ternative, and in the 
event the court ho lds that Aris did not abandon the Premises and breach the Lease and 
that II HI 1111 1 Wiisiitrh i m m Hi il I lit I i|inpniriil -ill llir " en, I r M 11 it |iiili 'mrnl Im lirhh 
damages under the forcible detainer statute and the j udgmen t for wrongful evict ion 
should be reversed and the amount of the judgment reduced by the amount of the 
i inpro | ici 1> a \ v ai ded tit c: I: le damages and the ii i ipi • ipt i h > aw at ded compensatory damages. 
DATED this 4th day of August, 2004. 
BURBII 
RICHARD D. BDRBJBG&-
Attorneys for Appellants 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MLED DISTRICT Cf'RT 
Third Judicial Dis. ic t 
JAN 2 7 200^ 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ARIS VISION INSTITUTE, INC., 11 
California corporation, dba 
ARIS VISION INC., 
Plaint , 
vs 
WASATCH PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, 
I N C , a Utah corporation, JIM 
PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, DAVID SKALKA, a.< 
individual, BRIAN SKALKA, an 
individual, and DENNIS PEACOCK, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 020900624 
m V i i : •" r ' ,-r »,. ' -c>~~:r 1: I Dvemt -ex 
14, 2v .. _,, in connection wiih the closing arguments iui the bench 
trial, which concluded on October 16., 2003. After hearing 
coun.-u n. f- ' _ .. . • . • 
supplemental briefs. .-xe defendants filed a Supplemental Briet ,-ij 
November 26, 2003. The plaintiff filed its Reply to Defendants1 
C~ < a:' '> . i ^:. :lt;i,. '" .-*•-, 1 ias i i: :: , 1 lad ai i 
opportunity LL again review and considei all of the parties' 
written product, the trial exhibits and the testimony that was 
opportunity to thank the respective counsel for the high level of 
ARIS VISION V. 
WASATCH PROPERTY MGMT. PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
professionalism ana candor both in the written submissions and 
during the course of the various hearings and the bench trial. 
Being fully informed, the Court rules as stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
At the outset, the Court notes that the plaintiff's assertion 
of the facts, set forth as "responses," in the plaintiff's Reply to 
Defendants' Closing Arguments, are consistent with this Court's 
findings and, along with the additional findings made herein, are 
to be incorporated into a proposed set of Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (which the Court directs the plaintiff's counsel 
to prepare). The Court also finds and concludes as follows: 
1. Credible evidence before the Court indicates that the 
defendants improperly changed the locks to the plaintiff's leased 
premises and that the defendants refused repeated requests by the 
plaintiff's representatives for the keys. The credible evidence 
further shows that defendants didn't even advise the plaintiff of 
these lock changes at the time. 
2. The Court heard credible testimony which indicated that 
the plaintiff had not abandoned or surrendered its leased premises, 
as those terms are defined in the law, prior to the locks being 
changed. Instead, the plaintiff merely conveyed an intention to 
close its operations at some time in the future. Further, Mr. 
Enright and Ms. Soto, both of whom the Court found to be highly 
V\o 
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credible witnesses, testified that the plaintiff's offer to pay the 
unpaid rent: w. - r :•-•- d 
3. The evidence before the Court indicates that despite 
repeated requests by the plaintiff's representatives to remove the 
p r o p e i: t y a t :i s s 1 i e „ ^ > r ^  >
 f; - . . . -.. ; ; 
unpersuaded by the defendants assertions that :L was men^y 
safeguarding tlo?* property for other potential claimants * * he 
p r o p * - • : .,.-.: • i ' - . • « ,. 
the leased premises. 'I o the contrary, JI appears to the Court that 
the defendants wer^ usinn r'n^  property as t bargaining chip in 
negr. r . . -^ \ "s"! " ' 
rent. As M:- ::=cr. testified it was hi i understanding from 
conversations with - Peacock that the defendants were refusing 
t : -.• * : r - . . - .••-.;..•• . . . . _ _ L _ _ — i i e m J 
despite Ms. Soto's credible testimony that a rental payment was in 
fact tendered. 
actions were part : ' t- problem early . n leading Aris to 
believe that the spac° it occupied wa^ ^einq ±e-let —v ~
 Ln fact, 
-»->*. . ^ ['pj.j: ' - * :,_-:'__:_; mangements ror the same 
group of doctors to lease other space in the building, at a more 
advantageous rate. 
3l\ 
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5. In contrast to Mr. Skalka's apparent duplicity, the Court 
found Mr. Dahlstrom to have operated in a way that demonstrated his 
desire for a resolution of this matter that was equitable for both 
sides. However, his agent, Mr. Peacock and others did not share 
this spirit of negotiation or understanding of an appropriate 
resolution. 
6. The Court finds that during the time period in question, 
the plaintiff's representatives were given very limited supervised 
access to the leased premises and were permitted to inspect their 
property, but only if they first obtained the defendants' 
permission and were accompanied by Mr. Peacock. The Court 
concludes that the limited inspection opportunities offered to the 
plaintiff were not an adequate substitute for the type of free 
access that accompany leasehold rights and privileges. Notably, 
keys to the premises for changed locks (a significant fact) were 
denied to the plaintiff. 
7. Overall, the Court concludes that because the defendants 
wrongfully excluded the plaintiff from its leased premises and 
denied it access to its property (including the removal of the 
same), the defendants are liable to the plaintiff for wrongful 
eviction, forcible detainer and conversion. 
8. Based on the foregoing, the Court rules in favor of the 
plaintiff and awards it the damages stemming from the depreciation 
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of its equipment and/or the loss or damage to the same. In 
determining damaqcr t he r- r *• founn ;r. Holdren's testi mon> to be 
credible anc Lnerercre Dases .Ls damages calculations on 1 lis 
testimony and expert report, Exhibit 51. I: ::-^:r.# the Court awards 
the pi aintiff $io7. - • - - ^ • • 
its written Closing Aig^mc^o, pursuanL tw ,nc forcible detainer 
statute (Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10 ( entitled \r 
mandatory *-v---\ ': *•- •--* 
award an;, puniLj-v^ aamages ^n aduition to Lnt, trebling amount based 
on its findina a::?; conclusion that the defendants' actions do not 
r:i i'f- ' * • :*r".— . :i ff — > . ::e oi: :1 i sregard 
needed to suppuii such damages. 
9, The ..' ^l^.. rules that the pi ad ntiff is entitled to 
1.:. PuisuaiiL to Paragraph 26.17 oi Li.e parties' lease, the 
plaintiff is also entitled to recover its attorney's fees and 
costs. 
1 1, Further, the Court is persuaded by the various cases 
relied on by f-- plaintiff which speak to the mutuali ty of the 
1 and] o r d '"' s . <.--;.L t- jat .-• . F 'oi ei t lost tl le 
Court relies on Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 
374-78 (Utah 1996), for its conclusion that once the defendants 
wrongf i ill;, e v icte I tl le plaii it iff and excluded it f i om the entirety 
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of its leased premises (including prohibiting the plaintiff from 
accessing and removing its property), the plaintiff's rental 
obligations were abated in the entirety. In fact, the defendants' 
improper conduct provides the basis for the Court to find that the 
parties' lease was terminated and the plaintiff relieved of any 
further obligations thereunder. The defendants' Counterclaim is 
therefore dismissed. 
12. However, the plaintiff has acknowledged its 
responsibility for the January rental payment and, in fact, as 
indicated above, tendered the same on various occasions. The Court 
therefore orders the plaintiff to pay the rent due for January to 
the defendants. 
As indicated above, counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that are consistent wir£B 
but not limited to this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this ^^'cba^of January, .2004. 
VUU 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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ARIS VISION V. 
WASATCH PROPERTY MGMT. PAGE 7 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I n>^  i I pd a true r d correct copy of the 
f oreo . — M - . s__2 
January, 2 0 04: 
R. Stephen Marshall 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Todd D. Weiler 
Attorney for Defendant Wasatcl i Propei ty 
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
0J/1I/ 
B. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
R. Stephen Marshall (2097) 
Erik A. Olson (8479) 
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)415-3000 
Facsimile: (801)415-3500 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 b 2004 
$ALI-.,LAKE COUNTY 
By. 
^ h L A * Y^m, 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
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/ 
This matter came before the Court at a bench trial on October 14, 15, and 16, 
^
liKv v . -sing argument was ncu: c-;. .\w-.wiwi»w. ; k_•• , IK parties submitted written closing 
argument briefs and submitted written responses to the written closing argument briefs. Plaintiff 
Aris Vision Institute, Inc., was represented at trial by R. Stephen Marshall of the law firm of 
4*o 
Durham Jones & Pinegar and defendants Wasatch Property Management, Inc., and JDJ 
Properties, Inc., were represented by Todd D. Weiler of the law firm of Parry Anderson & 
Gardiner. Defendants David Skalka, Brian Skalka, and Dennis Peacock have not been served 
with process in this matter and have not entered appearances. Claims against the three unserved 
defendants were not litigated at trial. 
Having considered the evidence and arguments of counsel, the Court entered its 
memorandum decision in this matter on January 22, 2004, in which the Court directed counsel 
for plaintiff to prepare written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based on the arguments 
of the parties, the testimony and credibility of witnesses at trial, the exhibits and other evidence 
presented at trial, subsequent oral and written submissions to the Court, the Court's 
memorandum decision, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters its findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Aris Vision Institute, Inc., ("Aris"), a California company, owned 
and operated a laser eye surgery center (the "Center") located in Suites 100 and 120 (the 
"Premises") within the Woodlands Business Park Tower I in Murray, Utah (the "Building"). 
2. Aris employed David Skalka ("Skalka") as Center manager and contracted 
with four physicians who agreed to perform eye surgeries at the Center (the "Doctors"). 
3. A i^s handled the bills for the Center, including all rental payments to the 
landlord. 
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4. Aris placed in the Premises furniture and multiple pieces of surgical 
5. Aris owned all of the equipment and furniture that it placed on the 
6. Pursuant to a written lease agreement (the "Lease"), Aris leased the 
Premises from defendant JDJ Properties, Inc., ("JDJ"). 
7. ' A ris deposited witl i JD I tl le si n i i of $13,393.89 as a sect irity deposit to 
secure the Lease. 
8. JD. .U;IL-CM- . ici company, Wasatch Property 
Management, Inc., ("Wasatch"), under which Wasatch agreed to manage the Building and collect 
rents from tenants. An i»i Wasatch's actions in this matter were within the scope of its agency 
and responsibilities dek L:;I; ] 
9. From its Logan, Utah headquarters, Wasatch directed all iii\ oices relating 
to tl le Pi emises to i \ i is' s I os i \ i igeles, Califoi i ria 1 leadqi lai ten s, at id i Iris n lailed all payments, 
including rents, from Aris's headquarters to Wasatch's headquarters. 
10. Long before Aris hired Skalka and the Doctors and opened the Center, 
Skalka and the Doctors had been tenants within the Buildim .n »-! in;< \ . 
relationship with Wasatch. Francis Wapner, one of the Doctors, had even performed vision 
coi i ectic i i sin gery foi Dei n lis Peacock ("Peacock"), Wasatcl I'S pi : pei ty i i iai lagei foi tl I s 
Building, and Dell Loy Hansen, the owner of JDJ and Wasatch. 
m 
11. After a severe downturn in the laser eye surgery business, Aris determined 
to close the Center, along with other centers across the United States. 
12. On January 4, 2002, Aris terminated several employees, including Skalka, 
and provided various notices to Skalka and vendors that Aris was "in the unfortunate position of 
having to wind down it[s] current operations and liquidate its business prior to dissolution." 
13. At the time, Aris sought to sell to Skalka and the Doctors all of Aris's 
property located on the Premises, and to have Skalka and the Doctors assume Aris's obligations 
under the Lease. 
14. Through February 9, 2002, while those negotiations moved forward, 
Skalka and the Doctors continued to occupy the Premises and performed surgeries on the 
Premises using Aris's equipment. 
15. Aris did not pay its January rent in the amount of $9,556.38 by January 1, 
2002, when it was due pursuant to the Lease. 
16. Sometime after the 1st of January, Peacock and Anita Lockhart 
("Lockhart"), Wasatch's property managers, confronted Skalka regarding the missed January rent 
payment. 
17. Skalka told them about his termination and Aris's financial trouble, and 
provided copies of the notices he had received from Aris, which indicated that Aris (1) had 
terminated Skalka's employment; (2) was ceasing all operations; and (3) would likely file for 
bankruptcy protection. 
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18. Peacock responded to Skalka that Aris's equipment and furniture could 
19. Skalka had already informed Lockhart in late 2001 that Aris would file for 
bankruptcy and ;;ia; ..^mw ar.v. .... v.^;ors were going to separate from Aris. 
20. By about mid-January 2002, Aris's negotiations with Skalka and the 
Doctors proved unsuccessful, and Aris elected to inventory, remove, and sell its furniture and 
eqi iipi I lent to pa/; escalatii lg debts. 
21. Aris arranged for the sale of its equipment and furniture, and sent its 
regionu: manager, Rienaiu L-iiriuu, irom L anionic u. ...L rremises for this purpose, and 
arranged in advance for a moving comp:rr • to remove and store all of Aris's property pending its 
sale. 
22. Oi I Jai n lai > 22, 2002, befoi e tl le i i 10 . i •. •* M-> odi > • 
on the Premises, Enright arrived at the Building and proceeded direct!} to the Premises, where he 
n let Skalka. 
23. Enright informed Skalka that he had come to remove all of Aris's furniture 
and equipment. 
24. Based oi. Pe.i/.-ik1 1M\/: \v i1-. * . . . , ..V-. u*: .»\.*d Skalka 
refused to permit Enright to remove the equipment and furniture, and advised Enright to speak 
d re. '\\;C'h k. 
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25. Skalka escorted Enright to Peacock's office within the Building, and 
introduced Enright to Peacock. Enright identified himself to Peacock as an Aris employee, and 
expressed his intention of removing Aris's equipment and furniture from the Premises. 
26. Peacock refused to release any equipment or furniture to Enright, and 
informed Enright that Aris had abandoned the Premises and had defaulted under the Lease by 
failing to pay its January rent. As a result, according to Peacock, Wasatch was entitled to seize 
Aris's personal propertyi 
27. Enright tendered a check to Peacock for the January rent, but Peacock 
responded that Wasatch would not accept it. 
28. While Enright was in Peacock's office, Peacock was contacted via 
telephone by Kathleen Soto ("Soto"), Aris's CFO, who informed him that Enright was an 
authorized representative of Aris, and requested that Peacock release all of Aris's property to 
Enright. 
29. Peacock repeated to Soto that Aris had abandoned the Premises under 
paragraph 20.1 of the Lease, and had defaulted under the Lease by failing to pay its January rent. 
As a result, according to Peacock, Wasatch was entitled to seize Aris's personal property. 
30. Soto responded to Peacock that Aris was pursuing its right under 
paragraph 20.1 of the Lease to remove its personal property before surrendering the premises. 
31. Like Enright, Soto offered to pay the January rent payment immediately 
via wire transfer, but Peacock indicated that such payment was too late and would not be 
accepted. 
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32. After Peacock completed his telephone conversation with Soto, Ennght 
again insisted that he be permitted to remove Aris's property. 
33. Instead of releasing Aris' property, however, Peacock directed Enright to 
leave the Premises immediately and threatened to have the police forcefully remove Enright if he 
ever returned again. 
34. Peacock did not contact any other representatives of Aris at that time, nor 
did he ever seek to obtain any contact information for Aris from Wasatch's Logan, Utah, 
headquarters to verify the statements made by Enright and Soto. 
35. Pursuant to Peacock's demand, Enright left the Premises without 
removing any equipment or furniture. 
36. The Court is not persuaded by Peacock's testimony that he turned Enright 
away because he did not know who he was. Peacock conceded that Wasatch's main office would 
have had Aris's California contact information. Yet, Peacock never even sought this information 
before turning Enright away, instead favoring Skalka, whom Peacock knew had been terminated. 
37. On January 23, 2004, the day after Enright's visit to the Premises, Aris 
filed this action seeking replevin of its property and damages. 
38. Shortly after Enright's encounter with Peacock, Erik Olson ("Olson"), 
counsel for Aris, contacted Dahlstrom and requested that Wasatch permit Aris to remove its 
property from the Premises. Olson also tendered in a letter to Dahlstrom Aris's January rent 
payment. 
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39. Dahlstrom refused to release the equipment and furniture to Aris, and did 
not accept the tender of January rent. 
40. Dahlstrom proposed that Aris consider a "business solution" under which 
Aris would sell its equipment and furniture to Skalka and the Doctors, and Skalka and the 
Doctors would assume the Lease obligations to Wasatch. Aris agreed to pursue such an 
arrangement. 
41. However, no one from JDJ or Wasatch disclosed to any representative of 
Aris that Lockhart had been working with Skalka and the Doctors since mid-2001 to set up a 
competing laser eye surgery center in another space within the Building at a more advantageous 
rent. No one disclosed to Aris that Skalka and the Doctors indeed consummated a new lease 
with Wasatch dated January 1, 2002, for another space within the Building that had been vacant 
for some time. Wasatch had a tremendous amount of vacant space in 2001 and 2002. 
42. There is no credible evidence that Wasatch had attempted at any time prior 
to January 22, 2002, to negotiate with Skalka and the Doctors to remain in the Premises, rather 
than relocate to another suite within the Building. 
43. By relocating Skalka and the Doctors within the Building, Wasatch 
intended to eliminate that vacancy and then look to Aris for payment of the full rent for the 
Premises. 
44. With Skalka and the Doctors relocated and Aris in financial trouble, 
Wasatch believed that holding Aris's personal property was a way to insure that JDJ would be 
paid under the Lease. Moreover, by providing to Skalka and the Doctors a substantially more 
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favorable lease in the same building, Wasatch made it unlikely that the Doctors would assume 
Aris's lease. 
45. No agreement was reached among Aris, Wasatch, Skalka, and the Doctors 
with respect to re-leasing the Premises to Skalka and the Doctors. 
46. On or shortly after February 9, 2002, Skalka and the Doctors vacated the 
Premises and relocated within the Building pursuant to their new lease. Wasatch never 
supervised Skalka and the Doctors' move or retrieved their key to the Premises. 
47. Sometime after Skalka and the Doctors vacated the Premises, Wasatch 
changed the locks to the Premises, but never provided a key to Aris and never advised Aris that 
the locks had been changed. 
48. On February 15, 2002, Aris served on Dahlstrom a motion for a writ of 
replevin in which Aris sought a Court order restoring to Aris all of its personal property located 
on the Premises. The Court scheduled a hearing on the motion for February 26, 2002, and 
Dahlstrom received notice of the hearing on the 21st of February. 
49. After receiving the motion for writ of replevin and the notice of hearing, 
Dahlstrom did not relent. He informed Olson that he would oppose the motion for writ of 
replevin. 
50. Dahlstrom asked for more time to prepare for the hearing, and Olson 
agreed to postpone the hearing until March 5, 2002. 
51. In the days leading up to the hearing, Dahlstrom never conceded that Aris 
was entitled to replevin of its personal property. Rather, he indicated his intention to oppose the 
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motion for writ of replevin, and warned that Aris would have to post a bond of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to secure the writ. 
52. Based on Dahlstrom's opposition to the replevin and insistence on a 
sizeable bond, Aris agreed to postpone indefinitely the March 5, 2002, hearing and work with 
Wasatch to locate a new tenant for the Premises. 
53. By agreeing to postpone the writ of replevin hearing and by working with 
Wasatch to find a new tenant for the Premises, neither Olson nor Aris ever intended to waive, 
settle, or release any claims set forth in this action, including its claims for replevin, conversion, 
wrongful eviction, and forcible detainer. 
54. In fact, there was no settlement at all between Aris and Wasatch. Olson 
and Axis's agreement with Wasatch was nothing more than an agreement to postpone the 
litigation to find any tenant who could use the space, as a means of reducing JDJ's claimed 
damages, avoiding the expense to Aris of posting a bond to secure the release of its property, and 
determining whether a settlement between Aris and Wasatch could be reached. 
55. Aris did not postpone the replevin hearing for the narrow purpose of 
attempting to re-let the premises to another laser surgery center tenant. While Aris attempted to 
make the best of the situation (such as locating Ed Barber and attempting to place Barber's group 
in the space), it was a remote possibility that a laser eye surgery tenant would relocate to the 
space when Skalka and the doctors conducted the same business downstairs. 
56. After the writ of replevin hearing was stricken from the Court's calendar, 
Dahlstrom and Olson worked together for a few months to resolve this matter in a manner that was 
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equitable for both sides. However, Mr. Peacock and other agents of Wasatch did not share this 
spirit of negotiation or understanding of an appropriate resolution. 
57. On various occasions between March and June 2002, Aris representatives 
were provided very limited, supervised access to the Premises. Access was granted only if Aris 
first obtained Wasatch's permission and was accompanied by Peacock, who was the only 
individual with a key to the Premises. 
58. Each visit was coordinated with and supervised by Peacock, who would 
unlock the door and stand guard on the Premises. As Peacock conceded, it was his job to 
supervise visitation to the Premises and "safeguard" Aris's property. According to Peacock, 
"safeguard" meant that he was not to allow anyone—including Aris—to take any equipment or 
furniture out of the Building. 
59. During these visits to the Premises, Aris inventoried its personal property. 
Enright discovered that three pieces of equipment had been removed from the Premises between 
his January 22, 2002, visit and his March 2002 inventory: 
a. Statim autoclave (item 230 on PI. Ex. 21); 
b. Compaq laptop (item 601 on PI. Ex. 21); and 
c. Hansatome microkeratome (item 1137 on PL Ex. 21). 
60. Additionally, Enright discovered that several pairs of high-end sunglasses 
were removed from the premises between January 22, 2002, and March 2002. 
61. Aris's inventories also discovered that two of Aris's lasers had sustained 
damage after Aris was excluded from the Premises. According to credible testimony by Soto, 
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which was uncontroverted, one laser's microscope was broken off, rendering the laser 
inoperable, and the assembly head covers on two lasers (including the laser with the damaged 
scope) were also damaged, rendering the lasers inoperable. 
62. Credible testimony from Soto established that these two damaged lasers 
had been operable immediately prior to Skalka and the Doctors vacating the Premises because 
VISX, the laser manufacturer, had issued "key cards" to Skalka and the Doctors enabling them to 
use the lasers up until they vacated on or about February 9, 2002. Thus, the damage sustained by 
the lasers occurred at the time—or after—Skalka and the Doctors vacated. 
63. During one supervised visit to the Premises, Aris and Olson convinced 
Peacock to release one small piece of equipment, but Peacock confirmed that no other articles 
were to be removed. 
64. On May 20, 2002, Aris memorialized an asset purchase agreement, under 
which Aris agreed to sell a tew pieces of its equipment to Ed Barber, who operated a laser eye 
surgery center, for $35,000 cash. Aris and Wasatch also attempted to persuade Barber to 
negotiate a new lease for the Premises. Barber ultimately was interested only in purchasing the 
equipment, and not leasing the Premises. 
65. OJson sought Dahlstrom's consent to the sale based on Wasatch's prior 
edict that no equipment or furniture be removed, and sent to Dahlstrom for his review a copy of 
an asset purchase agreement between Aris and Barber. Dahlstrom indicated that he would check 
with Wasatch, but did not anticipate any problem. 
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66. Olson arranged with Peacock and Barber a meeting on the Premises— 
supervised by Peacock—to close the equipment sale on June 10, 2002. Olson, Enright, and Soto 
attended the meeting for Aris. Barber attended the meeting. Glen McKay represented Wasatch 
at the meeting, along with Peacock. At the meeting, Aris and Barber signed the asset purchase 
agreement for the $35,000 of Aris's equipment. 
67. During the meeting, Olson telephoned Dahlstrom from the Premises to 
confirm that the sale could proceed, but Dahlstrom forbade it, indicating that Wasatch had not yet 
approved the transaction. Aris then left the meeting without the $35,000, and Barber left the 
meeting without the equipment. 
68. A few days later, Dahlstrom telephoned Olson and indicated that Wasatch 
would only permit Aris to sell the equipment to Barber if Aris paid the entire $35,000 proceeds 
to Wasatch. 
69. On or about June 19, 2002, Salt Lake County posted a notice of seizure on 
the Premises setting forth an indebtedness from Aris in the amount of $14,210 for property taxes 
and related fees. 
70. Shortly after the notice of seizure was posted on the Premises, Peacock 
changed the locks on the Premises a second time. Again, he failed to notify Aris that he had 
changed the locks, and failed to provide a key to any representative of Aris. 
71. At or about the time Peacock changed the locks a second time, Soto 
traveled from California to the Premises with the intention of breaking the locks on the Premises 
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doors and removing all of Aris's property. She had contacted a locksmith and moving company 
for these purposes. 
72. However, discovering the notice of seizure posted on the Premises, Soto 
went to the Salt Lake County Assessor's office and paid the entire indebtedness. She then 
decided not to proceed with the locksmith and moving company that day because it appeared that 
Wasatch employees were guarding the Premises. 
73. Shortly after Soto's visit to the Premises, Olson contacted Dahlstrom and 
informed him that Aris had no intention of paying any proceeds from the Barber sale to Wasatch, 
and intended instead to proceed with the lawsuit, including the writ for replevin of Aris's 
equipment and furniture. 
74. On or about June 25, 2002, Dahlstrom informed Olson for the first time 
that Wasatch never intended to withhold any of Aris's personal property and that Aris was 
entitled to remove it all. 
75. Peacock received an e-mail from Lockhart on June 26, 2002, directing him 
to release Aris's property. Peacock responded to Lockhart, "Is this correct?" Lockhart then 
replied to Peacock that Aris was now allowed to take all of its personal property from the 
Premises. 
76. The Court finds that the directive Peacock received from Lockhart on June 
26 and 28, 2002, to release Aris's equipment and furniture was a change from previous 
instructions. Based on Peacock and Lockhart's e-mail exchange, the Court finds that Peacock 
previously had been instructed not to allow Aris to remove its equipment and furniture. 
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77. On July 2, 2002, Soto removed all of Aris's personal property from the 
Premises, and sold a portion of the equipment to Barber for $35,000 as previously agreed. 
78. As both Soto and Aris's expert, Richard Holdren ("Holdren"), testified, 
laser surgery equipment depreciates extremely rapidly and becomes obsolete because new 
models are released every 12 to 18 months. As Soto's credible testimony indicated, Aris could 
have obtained $200,000 for the lasers in January 2002 and only $55,000 to $60,000 for the lasers 
in July 2002. 
79. As detailed in Holdren's report, the total amount by which Aris's personal 
property depreciated while it was within Wasatch's custody is $118,568.81. Wasatch did not call 
any rebuttal expert or otherwise offer any rebuttal testimony relating to the depreciation of Aris's 
property. 
80. As Holdren's uncontroverted expert testimony established, the value of the 
three items of equipment that became missing from the Premises between January 22, 2002, and 
Enright's inventory in March and April 2002 was as follows at the time Aris was permitted to 
remove its property from the Premises: 
a. Statim autoclave (item 230 on PL Ex. 21): $393.60; 
b. Compaq laptop (item 601 on PL Ex. 21): $574.98; and 
c. Hansatome microkeratome (item 1137 on PL Ex. 21): $14,164.68. 
81. As credible, uncontroverted testimony from Enright established, the value 
of the missing sunglasses was $985.56. 
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82. After removing its personal property from the Premises, Aris sold the two 
damaged lasers to VISX, which credited the value of the lasers against Aris's debt to VISX. As 
Soto's credible, uncontroverted testimony established, based on the damage that the lasers had 
sustained, VISX deducted $53,000 from the credit Aris received. The third laser was sold to 
VISX at a loss. 
83. While the three lasers had been secured by collateralized loans to 
Newcourt Financial and Imperial Bank, Aris paid off both of those loans sometime after Aris was 
enabled to remove the lasers from the Premises. 
84. Wasatch produced no credible evidence at trial to controvert Soto's 
credible testimony that Aris owned all of the personal property on the Premises, including the 
three lasers. 
85. Neither Wasatch nor JDJ has ever had a property interest in any of the 
furniture or equipment that was located on the Premises. Nor was any credible evidence received 
at trial of other potential claimants to Aris's personal property, much less claimants who had 
authorized Wasatch to seize the property. 
86. Wasatch knew as early as January 22, 2002, that Aris wanted access to the 
Premises to remove its belongings. From this date up until the date Soto removed Aris's 
property, Wasatch refused repeated requests by Aris representatives for permission to remove 
Aris's property. On multiple occasions, Wasatch prevented Aris from entering into the Premises 
with intent to deprive Aris of such entry. 
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87. During this period, Aris did not have free and unfettered access to the 
Premises nor could it remove its personal property from the Premises. From the time Wasatch 
changed the locks, Aris had no keys to the Premises. As a result, Aris could have removed its 
equipment and furniture only by breaking into the Premises, obtaining a Court order, or receiving 
Wasatch's permission. 
88. Wasatch never sought the assistance of the Court in evicting Aris, taking 
possession of the Premises, or taking possession of Aris's personal property. 
89. While Aris's personal property was in Wasatch's custody, Wasatch was 
not merely safeguarding the property for Aris or for potential claimants to the property, nor did 
Wasatch consider Aris's property to be merely "stored" at the Premises. To the contrary, because 
Wasatch knew that Aris was in financial trouble, Wasatch refused to allow Aris's personal 
property to be released, and instead used it as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Aris with 
respect to the payment of rent. 
90. There is no credible evidence that Aris ever vacated the Premises prior to 
January 22, 2002. Likewise, there is no credible evidence that Aris intended or offered to 
surrender the Lease, much less any evidence that Wasatch or JDJ intended to accept such 
surrender. Rather, Aris's personal property remained on the Premises, and Skalka and the 
Doctors continued to occupy the Premises until February 9, 2002. 
91. Since Peacock refused to release Aris's personal property—thus 
preventing Aris from selling it and reaching a settlement with Wasatch—Aris was unable to 
surrender the lease. 
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92. On or about July 24, 2002, JDJ entered into a new lease for the Premises 
with Utah Financial. Utah Financial took occupancy of the Premises on September 1, 2002. 
93. Since relocating within the Building, Skalka and the Doctors have 
negotiated with Wasatch to build out a new, larger surgery center for them in an expensive, main-
floor-level space in an adjacent building owned by JDJ. 
94. As of January 4, 2002, Aris did not conduct any further business in Utah, 
apart from the isolated transaction of selling $35,000 of equipment to Barber. Aris negotiated to 
sell equipment in Utah to Barber and no one else. The asset purchase agreement with Barber was 
negotiated on May 20, 2002, and the sale would have closed on June 10, 2002, had not Wasatch 
refused to allow the equipment to be released. 
95. On May 23, 2002, Aris's registration to do business in Utah expired for 
failure to file a renewal. 
96. In the answer that Wasatch and JDJ filed in this action, Wasatch and JDJ 
never raised insufficiency of process as an affirmative defense, nor did they allege any failure to 
comply with indorsement provisions or other requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8 (2002). 
97. Based on the affidavit of attorney fees of R. Stephen Marshall, the Court 
finds that Aris has incurred attorney fees in connection with this action in the amount of 
$_ . 
98. Based on the affidavit of attorney fees of R. Stephen Marshall, the Court 
finds that Aris has incurred costs and necessary disbursements in connection with this action in 
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the amount of $ . The Court finds that these items are correct and have 
been incurred necessarily and in good faith in this action. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Inherent in the Lease is the right of Aris to free, unfettered access to the 
Premises. The limited, supervised inspection opportunities that Wasatch offered to Aris were not 
an adequate substitute for the type of free access that accompany leasehold rights and 
privileges. Inherent in the Lease is the right of the tenant to have a key to the Premises. Aris 
did not need to ask for a key to access its own property. 
2. Wasatch had no authority under Utah law to exclude Aris from the 
Premises without judicial process and thereby exclude Aris from removing its personal 
property. 
3. By agreeing to postpone the writ of replevin hearing and working with 
Wasatch to find a new tenant for the Premises, Aris did not waive, settle, or release any claims 
set forth in this action, including its claims for replevin, conversion, wrongful eviction, and 
forcible detainer. There was no settlement between Aris and Wasatch. 
4. At all relevant times, Peacock, Lockhart, and Dahlstrom were acting 
within the scope of their employment by Wasatch. 
5. At all relevant times, Wasatch and its employees were acting as authorized 
agents of JDJ. All of Wasatch's actions in this matter were within the scope of its agency. 
6. JDJ is the "owner" of the Premises as that term is defined in Utah Code 
Ann. §78-36-12.3(2) (2002). 
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7. By the acts of Wasatch, JDJ's duly authorized agent, JDJ willfully and 
unlawfully excluded Aris from the Premises without judicial process in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §78-36-12(2002). 
8. Wasatch and JDJ's exclusion of Aris from the Premises and denial of 
access to Aris's personal property (including removal of the same) constituted a wrongful 
eviction and conversion. 
9. Wasatch and JDJ's forceful, unlawful possession of the Premises during 
Aris's tenancy constituted a forcible detainer as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-2 
(2002). 
10. Wasatch and JDJ were not acting as—and had no authority to act as— 
agents of Salt Lake County, Imperial Bank, Newcourt Financial, or any other creditor of Aris 
when Wasatch and JDJ seized Aris's equipment and furniture. 
11. Likewise, the facts of Aris's collateralized loans or the June 19, 2002, tax 
lien notice provide no excuse for Wasatch and JDJ's conversion of Aris's personal property. 
12. As Wasatch and JDJ conceded at trial, the Lease did not provide a security 
interest to JDJ or Wasatch. Absent such a security interest, JDJ and Wasatch had no right to self-
help seizure of the equipment and furniture on the Premises. 
13. Aris is entitled to an award of damages against Wasatch and JDJ, jointly 
and severally, in the amount of all damages proximately caused by Wasatch and JDJ's wrongful 
eviction, conversion, and forcible detainer. 
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14. The wrongful eviction, conversion, and forcible detainer each proximately 
caused the following damages to Aris: 
a. $118,568.81, representing the depreciation of Aris's equipment and 
furniture for the time period in which Wasatch and JDJ deprived Aris of the 
property located on the Premises; 
b. $16,118.82, representing the aggregate value of the statim 
autoclave, Compaq laptop, and hansatome microkeratome, and sunglasses that 
were missing from the Premises; 
c. $53,000.00, representing the damage that Aris's lasers sustained 
while in Wasatch and JDJ's possession. 
15. Pursuant to the forcible detainer statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3) 
(2002), Aris is entitled to a mandatory trebling of its damages against Wasatch and JDJ, jointly 
and severally, which totals $563,062.90 (three times the total damages in the amount of 
$187,687.63). 
16. The Court does not conclude that Aris is entitled to punitive damages 
against Wasatch or JDJ because Aris has not met its burden of showing that Wasatch or JDJ's 
actions demonstrate a knowing and reckless indifference toward, or disregard of, Aris's rights. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (2002). 
17. Aris is entitled to recover its security deposit in the amount of $13,393.89. 
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18. Wasatch did not accept Aris's tender of its January, 2002, rent. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-1. Nevertheless, as Aris conceded at trial, Aris's damages must be offset 
by the amount of the January rent due, $9,556.38. 
19. JDJ's obligation under the Lease to provide free, unfettered access to the 
Premises and any personal property located on the Premises, and Aris's obligation under the 
Lease to make rental payments, were mutually dependent leasehold covenants. 
20. Based on the doctrine of mutually dependent covenants recognized in 
Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 374-78 (Utah 1996), and other 
authorities set forth therein, the Court concludes that when JDJ and Wasatch wrongfully evicted 
Aris and excluded Aris from the entirety of the Premises (including prohibiting Aris from 
accessing and removing its property), Aris's rental obligations were abated in their entirety. 
21. Moreover, based on Wasatch and JDJ's improper conduct, the Lease was 
terminated and Aris was relieved of any further obligations thereunder. 
22. JDJ's counterclaim should therefore be dismissed. 
23. Pursuant to Paragraph 26.17 of the Lease and Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-
10(3), Aris is entitled to recover from Wasatch and JDJ its attorney's fees and costs. 
24. After evaluating a number of factors, including the difficulty of the 
litigation, the efficiency of Aris's attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the 
number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar 
services, the amount involved in the case, the result attained, and the expertise and experience of 
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the lawyers involved, the Court concludes that Aris is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney 
fees in the amount of $ . 
25. Aris is also entitled to an award of necessarily incurred costs and 
disbursements in the amount of $ . 
26. Aris's sale of $35,000 of equipment to Barber did not constitute 
"transacting business" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-l 501(1) (2001). 
27. Additionally and alternatively, the sale to Barber was merely an "isolated 
transaction" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1501(2)(j) (2001). If not for 
Wasatch's seizure of Aris's personal property, the sale of equipment would have been 
consummated within 30 days. 
28. Aris did not "transact business" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 
16-10a-1501(l) (2001) at any time after it ceased operations in Utah on January 4, 2002. 
29. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1501(3) (2001), Aris was authorized 
to bring and prosecute this action. As a result, JDJ and Wasatch's motion to dismiss should be 
denied. 
30. Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Wasatch and 
JDJ have waived any defense of insufficiency of process or failure to comply with indorsement 
requirements or other provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8 (2002). 
31. There is no evidence or authority to support either a surrender or 
acceptance. Aris never surrendered its tenancy to JDJ, nor did Aris at any point in time ever 
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"abandon" the Premises as "abandonment" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12.3 and 
Fashion Place Assocs. v. Glad Rags, Inc., 754 P.2d 940, 941 (Utah 1988). 
32. Service of process on defendants David Skalka, Brian Skalka, and Dennis 
Peacock has not been made and as a result, claims against these three defendants should be 
dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this JO day of Fsteuary, 2004. 
BY THE COURT 
Leslie A. Lewis 
Third District Judge 
• si 
* *•'.. STATE OT.Vdj^ ' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this °\ day of March, 2004, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was served via hand-delivery to 
the following: 
Todd D. Weiler 
Parry Anderson & Gardiner 
1270 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
3^L gM 
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DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)415-3000 
Facsimile: (801) 415-3500 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR ' 3 2004 
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Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARIS VISION INSTITUTE, INC., a 
California corporation, d/b/a ARIS VISION, 
INC., 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
WASATCH PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, 
INC., a Utah corporation, JDJ PROPERTIES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, DAVID SKALKA, 
an individual, BRIAN SKALKA, an 
individual, and DENNIS PEACOCK, an 
individual, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AGAINST WASATCH 
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., 
AND JDJ PROPERTIES, INC. 
Civil No. 020900624 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Judgment Against Wasatch Property Management, Inc 
JD13728099 
020900624 WASATCH PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 
This matter came before the Court at a bench trial, which concluded on October 
16, 2003. Plaintiff Aris Vision Institute, Inc., ("Aris") was represented at trial by R. Stephen 
Marshall, and defendants Wasatch Property Management, Inc., ("Wasatch") and JDJ Properties, 
Inc., ("JDJ") were represented by Todd D. Weiler. Having carefully reviewed all of the evidence 
H"iv 
received at trial, along with the written and oral arguments of counsel, and based on the Court's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Judgment is ENTERED against Wasatch and JDJ, jointly and severally, 
for treble damages in the total amount of $553,506.51 (three times $187,687.63 less the rent due 
in the amount of $9,556.38), attorney fees in the amount of $ fob. O^^ , and costs in / 
the amount of $ 0 j / -J for a total judgment in the amount of$ jOc^Q. u V 7- - ; ' 
together with post-judgment interest at the legal rate; 
2. In addition to the foregoing judgment, judgment is also ENTERED against 
JDJ for the amount of $13,393.89 (security deposit), together with post-judgment interest at the 
legal rate; 
i n
 ; 
JDJ's counterclaim against Aris is DISMISSED with prejudice and on the 
merits; 
4. JDJ and Wasatch's motion to dismiss is DENIED; and 
5. Aris's claims against defendants David Skalka, Brian Skalka, and Dennis 
Peacock are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to serve these defendants with process. 
DATED this ]j& clayof February, 2004. 
BYTHE€t>URT 
a :/w- he A. Lewis 
Third District Judge 
M - a * 
JUDGMENT DEBTOR INFORMATION (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1.5) 
1. Judgment debtor Wasatch Property Management, Inc., ("Wasatch") was 
served through its Vice President and General Counsel, John A. Dahlstrom, Jr., at 299 South 
Main Street, Suite 2400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
2. Judgment debtor JDJ Properties, Inc., ("JDJ") was also served through Mr. 
Dahlstrom at 299 South Main Street, Suite 2400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
3. The last known business addresses of Wasatch and JDJ are 299 South 
Main Street, Suite 2400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and 399 North Main, Suite 200, Logan, 
Utah 84321. 
4. The name and address of the judgment creditor is Aris Vision Institute, 
Inc., dba Aris Vision, Inc., 2730 Armacoast Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90064. 
5. The tax ID numbers of Wasatch and JDJ are unknown. 
6. The judgment has not been stayed. 
7. Any further information required by section 78-22-1.5 but not provided in 
this statement is unknown and unavailable to the judgment creditor. 
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